Results 251 to 260 of about 133,491 (305)

JOM Forum: Theory Testing Is Theory Generation

open access: yes
Journal of Operations Management, EarlyView.
Mikko Ketokivi   +6 more
wiley   +1 more source

Epistemically flawless false beliefs

Synthese, 2020
A starting point for the sort of alethic epistemological approach that dominates both historical and contemporary western philosophy is that epistemic norms, standards, or ideals are to be characterized by appeal to some kind of substantively normative relationship between belief and truth.
openaire   +1 more source

Common belief in monotonic epistemic logic [PDF]

open access: possibleMathematical Social Sciences, 1996
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire   +2 more sources

Epistemic Risk and Epistemic Utility for Beliefs

2022
AbstractIn this chapter, we meet Thomas Kelly’s (2014) argument for permissivism about rational belief. It is inspired by William James’ (1897) permissivism about attitudes to epistemic risk. We interpret Kelly’s argument using an account of epistemic value due to Kenny Easwaran (2016) and Kevin Dorst (2019).
openaire   +1 more source

Epistemic Beliefs and Moral Reasoning

The Journal of Psychology, 1998
Abstract The relationship among age, education, gender, syllogistic reasoning skill, epistemic beliefs, and moral reasoning in adults was examined. It was predicted that five epistemic dimensions would explain unique variance in moral reasoning over and above all other variables. This hypothesis was confirmed. Beliefs corresponding to simple knowledge,
Lisa D. Bendixen   +2 more
openaire   +1 more source

Epistemically Proper Belief

2018
This chapter argues that the sort of normativity that is at the heart of epistemology is the sort of normativity involved in assessments of whether a subject’s belief satisfies the distinctly epistemic standards on knowledge. It introduces the term ‘epistemically proper’ to designate the status a belief has when it satisfies these standards. The author
openaire   +1 more source

The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs

2020
Abstract Ideally, we would have beliefs that satisfy norms of truth and rationality, as well as fostering the acquisition, retention and use of other relevant information. In reality, we have limited cognitive capacities and are subject to motivational biases on an everyday basis, and may also experience impairments in perception, memory,
openaire   +1 more source

Epistemic Involuntarism and Undesirable Beliefs

Southwest Philosophy Review, 2023
Epistemologists debate the nature of epistemic responsibility. Rarely do they consider the implications of this debate on assigning responsibility for undesirable beliefs such as racist and sexist ones. Contrary to our natural tendency to believe and to act as if we are responsible for holding undesirable beliefs, empirical evidence indicates that ...
openaire   +1 more source

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