Results 211 to 220 of about 3,262 (253)

Intensionality and Epistemic Justification

Philosophia (United States), 2012
The purpose of this paper is to raise a new objection to externalist process reliabilism about epistemic justification. The objection is that epistemic justification is intensional—it does not permit the substitution of co-referring expressions—and reliabilism cannot accommodate that.
Patrick Bondy
exaly   +2 more sources

Epistemic Justification and Normativity

2001
Abstract Is epistemic justification normative? Discusses four ways of justifying a positive answer, none of which the writer thinks succeed: epistemic justification is normative because it is (1) analogous to moral normativity, (2) a matter of following rules; (3) a matter of trying to achieve certain goals; and (4) analyzable in terms ...
Richard Fumerton
exaly   +2 more sources

Goldman on epistemic justification

Philosophia (United States), 1989
William P Alston
exaly   +2 more sources

Introducing Justification into Epistemic Logic

Journal of Logic and Computation, 2005
Plato's tripartite definition of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB) is generally regarded as a set of necessary conditions for the possession of knowledge. The true belief components the JTB definition are represented in formal epistemology by modal logic and its possible worlds semantics.
Sergei N. Artëmov, Elena Nogina
openaire   +1 more source

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