Results 191 to 200 of about 540 (229)
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MORAL AND EPISTEMIC LUCK

Metaphilosophy, 2006
: It is maintained that the arguments put forward by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in their widely influential exchange on the problem of moral luck are marred by a failure to (i) present a coherent understanding of what is involved in the notion of luck, and (ii) adequately distinguish between the problem of moral luck and the analogue problem of ...
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Scepticism and Epistemic Luck

2005
AbstractI discuss the sceptical challenge in the light of the distinction between veritic and reflective epistemic luck and argue that the inadequacy of the main anti-sceptical proposals in the contemporary literature is a result of how they only (at best) eliminate veritic luck, and thus do not engage with the problem of reflective luck at all ...
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Epistemic Luck

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2008
Richard Greene, Rachel Robison
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Scepticism, epistemic luck, and epistemicangst

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2005
A commonly expressed worry in the contemporary literature on the problem of epistemological scepticism is that there is something deeply intellectually unsatisfying about the dominant anti-sceptical theories. In this paper I outline the main approaches to scepticism and argue that they each fail to capture what is essential to the sceptical challenge ...
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Luck as an epistemic notion

Synthese, 2009
Although many philosophers have argued that an event is lucky for an agent only if it was suitably improbable, there is considerable disagreement about how to understand this improbability condition. This paper argues for a hitherto overlooked construal of the improbability condition in terms of the lucky agent’s epistemic situation.
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Conclusive Reasons and Epistemic Luck

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2015
What is it to have conclusive reasons to believe a proposition P? According to a view famously defended by Dretske, a reason R is conclusive for P just in case [R would not be the case unless P were the case]. I argue that, while knowing that P is plausibly related to having conclusive reasons to believe that P, having such reasons cannot be understood
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THE EPISTEMIC ANALYSIS OF LUCK

Episteme, 2015
AbstractDuncan Pritchard has argued that luck is fundamentally a modal notion: an event is lucky when it occurs in the actual world, but does not occur in more than half of the relevant nearby possible worlds. Jennifer Lackey has provided counterexamples to accounts which, like Pritchard's, only allow for the existence of improbable lucky events.
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Cancers make their own luck: theories of cancer origins

Nature Reviews Cancer, 2023
Benjamin D Simons, Richard J Gilbertson
exaly  

Chinese securities investment funds: the role of luck in performance

Review of Accounting and Finance, 2021
Jun Gao   +2 more
exaly  

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