Results 251 to 260 of about 5,529,456 (280)

Complementary Explanations

Synthese, 1999
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Explanation in Physics: Explanation

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 1990
In what sense do the sciences explain? Or do they merely describe what is going on without answering why-questions at all. But cannot description at an appropriate ‘level’ provide all that we can reasonably ask of an explanation? Well, what do we mean by explanation anyway?
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[Explanation] Is Explanation Better

Philosophy of Science, 1997
Robert Wilson (1994) maintains that many interesting and fundamental aspects of psychology are non-individualistic because large chunks of psychology depend upon organisms being deeply embedded in some environment. I disagree and present one version of narrow content that allows enough reference to the environment to meet any wide challenge.
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Hippocratic explanations

2005
This paper considers VM's largely unrecognised contribution to a debate which spanned philosophy and medicine concerning the demands an adequate explanation must meet in the operation of a craft. VM's special contribution consists in indicating a means to an understanding of a mutual interdependence of theory and practice which acknowledges the ...
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Aleatory Explanations

Synthese, 1981
Abstract The question of what role negatively relevant factors should play in explanations that refer to probabilistic causes is addressed. A distinction between contributing and counteracting causes is drawn. Arguments are given that citing the probability value as part of the explanation is unnecessary, that restricting the explanatory
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Functional explanation and the function of explanation

Cognition, 2006
Teleological explanations (TEs) account for the existence or properties of an entity in terms of a function: we have hearts because they pump blood, and telephones for communication. While many teleological explanations seem appropriate, others are clearly not warranted--for example, that rain exists for plants to grow.
Tania, Lombrozo, Susan, Carey
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Contrastive Explanation

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 1990
According to a causal model of explanation, we explain phenomena by giving their causes or, where the phenomena are themselves causal regularities, we explain them by giving a mechanism linking cause and effect. If we explain why smoking causes cancer, we do not give the cause of this causal connection, but we do give the causal mechanism that makes it.
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Explanation and explanation by hypothesis

Synthese, 1976
In this paper I locate and discuss a number of problems involved in a proposal to revise very considerably what may fairly be called the received account of Freud as scientist manqu?. My purpose is in no way exegetical or antiquarian. It is because of the attention currently (and properly) paid to him by certain philosophers that I choose Freud as a ...
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Learnability explanations and processing explanations

Natural Language and Linguistic Theory, 1984
In this paper I introduced three of the central constraints of the learnability proof of Wexler and Culicover (1980). The question arose as to how we might handle in other ways the data that the Raising Principle accounts for. While a processing account appears plausible, it appears that at least one promising analysis of that sort does not work.
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Reductive Explanation and Mechanistic Explanation

2014
Reduction reconciles diversity and directionality with strong unity, without relying on elimination. Unity is achieved by identification; diversity is conceptual or descriptive in nature; but what about directionality? Directionality can be accounted for in terms of explanation. The present and the following chapter motivate this idea and connect it to
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