Results 81 to 90 of about 484,295 (198)
The assumptions of necessary rationality and necessary knowledge of strategies, also known as perfect prediction, lead to at most one surviving outcome, immune to the knowledge that the players have of them.
Fourny, Ghislain
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Negative results in the theory of games with lexicographic utilities [PDF]
When players may have lexicographic utilities, there are: (i) extensive games having a non-empty set of equilibria but empty sets of sequentially rational, sequential and perfect equilibria (ii) normal form games having a non-empty set of equilibria but ...
Antonio Quesada
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Strategie equivalence and bounded rationality in extensive form games [PDF]
In a large family of solution concepts for boundedly rational players - allowing players to be imperfect optimizers, but requiring that better responses are chosen with probabilities at least as high as those of worse responses - most of Thompson's ...
Lundström, Helena Fagraeus +1 more
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Small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) need a platform that actively enables collaboration with research institutions and consultants as SMEs lack the financial resources to conduct independent research.
Chibuzor Udokwu
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Developing Game-Based Design for eHealth in Practice: 4-Phase Game Design Process
BackgroundGames are increasingly used in eHealth as a strategy for user engagement. There is an enormous diversity of end users and objectives targeted by eHealth.
Frederiek de Vette +5 more
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Sidentop (1998) argued that an adequate and effective learning process in Sport Education[1] should lead to the development of competent, aware, and enthusiastic student-athletes[2].
Francesco Sgrò
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Games in code form versus games in extensive form
The idea of a new game representation occurred when we analysed a game with 3 players in the normal form. It seemed that a representation that gave us a global picture of the game would be the ideal. As a consequence of this idea, we were tried a game representation that agglutinated the information of extensive form and of normal form. We imagined the
Peixoto, C., Ferreira, M. A. M.
openaire +1 more source
The Canonical Extensive Form of a Game Form - Part II - Representation [PDF]
This paper exhibits to any noncooperative game in strategic or normal form a 'canonical' game in extensive form that preserves all symmetries of the former one.
Bezalel Peleg +2 more
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Strategic equivalence and bounded rationality in extensive form games [PDF]
In a large family of solution concepts for boundedly rational players --- allowing players to be imperfect optimizers, but requiring that ``better'' responses are chosen with probabilities at least as high as those of ``worse'' responses --- most of ...
Fagraeus Lundström, Helena +1 more
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Курочкин О. Из истории формирования института гостеприимства. В сообщении прослеживаются истоки и основные этапы становления общеевропейского института гостеприимства.
Курочкін Олександр
doaj

