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EQUIVALENCE OF GAMES IN EXTENSIVE FORM
Classics in Game Theory, 2020F. B. Thompson
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Recall in extensive form games [PDF]
International Journal of Game Theory, 1999 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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On the Optimality of Dilated Entropy and Lower Bounds for Online Learning in Extensive-Form Games
Neural Information Processing SystemsFirst-order methods (FOMs) are arguably the most scalable algorithms for equilibrium computation in large extensive-form games. To operationalize these methods, a distance-generating function, acting as a regularizer for the strategy space, must be ...
Zhiyuan Fan +2 more
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2017
This chapter discusses a number of key concepts for extensive form game representation. It first considers a matrix that defines a zero-sum matrix game for which the minimizer has two actions and the maximizer has three actions and shows that the matrix description, by itself, does not capture the information structure of the game and, in fact, other ...
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This chapter discusses a number of key concepts for extensive form game representation. It first considers a matrix that defines a zero-sum matrix game for which the minimizer has two actions and the maximizer has three actions and shows that the matrix description, by itself, does not capture the information structure of the game and, in fact, other ...
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COMPROMISING IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES AND COOPERATION IN PERFECT EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES [PDF]
International Game Theory Review, 2006 In this paper reasonable payoff intervals for players in a game in partition function form (p.f.f. game) are introduced and used to define the notion of compromisable p.f.f. game. For a compromisable p.f.f. game a compromise value is defined for which an axiomatic characterization is provided.
Emiko Fukuda +3 more
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A Lower Bound on Swap Regret in Extensive-Form Games
arXiv.orgRecent simultaneous works by Peng and Rubinstein [2024] and Dagan et al. [2024] have demonstrated the existence of a no-swap-regret learning algorithm that can reach $\epsilon$ average swap regret against an adversary in any extensive-form game within $m^
Constantinos Daskalakis +4 more
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Efficient $\Phi$-Regret Minimization with Low-Degree Swap Deviations in Extensive-Form Games
Neural Information Processing SystemsRecent breakthrough results by Dagan, Daskalakis, Fishelson and Golowich [2023] and Peng and Rubinstein [2023] established an efficient algorithm attaining at most $\epsilon$ swap regret over extensive-form strategy spaces of dimension $N$ in $N^{\tilde ...
B. Zhang +3 more
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The Value of Recall in Extensive-Form Games
AAAI Conference on Artificial IntelligenceImperfect-recall games—in which players may forget previously acquired information—have found many practical applications, ranging from game abstractions to team games and testing AI agents.
Ratip Emin Berker +4 more
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Playing Extensive Form Games in Parallel
2010Consider a player playing against different opponents in two extensive form games simultaneously. Can she then have a strategy in one game using information from the other? The famous example of playing chess against two grandmasters simultaneously illustrates such reasoning.
Ghosh, S., Ramanujam, R., Simon, S.
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Incremental Strategy Generation for Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018Dynamic interaction appears in many real-world scenarios where players are able to observe (perhaps imperfectly) the actions of another player and react accordingly.
Jakub Černý +2 more
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