Results 31 to 40 of about 156 (155)

Why Do Children From Age 4 Fail True Belief Tasks? A Decision Experiment Testing Competence Versus Performance Limitation Accounts

Cognitive Science, Volume 49, Issue 6, June 2025.
Abstract The standard view on Theory of Mind (ToM) is that the mastery of the false belief (FB) task around age 4 marks the ontogenetic emergence of full‐fledged meta‐representational ToM. Recently, a puzzling finding has emerged: Once children master the FB task, they begin to fail true belief (TB) control tasks. This finding threatens the validity of
Lydia Paulin Schidelko, Hannes Rakoczy
wiley   +1 more source

Hinge trust*

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 110, Issue 3, Page 939-958, May 2025.
Abstract Trust is central to epistemology, particularly in accounts of testimony, where it describes the relationship between a hearer and a speaker (or trustor and trustee), enabling the acquisition of information. The speaker's trustworthiness—marked by sincerity and knowledge—is essential for testimony to transmit knowledge or justified belief ...
Annalisa Coliva
wiley   +1 more source

Epistemic Value and Fortuitous Truth

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, 1997
Why are the conditions for propositional knowledge so difficult to discover or devise in this post-Gettier age? Why do not most epistemologists agree on roughly the same analysis as they appear to have done in the pre-Gettier paradise?
Colin Cheyne
doaj  

A modal theory of justification

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 110, Issue 3, Page 1031-1045, May 2025.
Abstract This article develops a modal theory of justification, according to which a belief is justified if it is more possible that it amounts to knowledge than that it does not. The core of the theory is neutral between internalism and externalism and it solves two problems that extant modal accounts of justification suffer from.
Jaakko Hirvelä
wiley   +1 more source

Educating Open‐Mindedness through Philosophy in Schools

Educational Theory, Volume 75, Issue 2, Page 315-326, April 2025.
Abstract Closed‐mindedness is a characteristic trait of irresponsible believers. For this reason and others, educators should actively discourage closed‐mindedness in their students. One way to do this is to cultivate its opposing virtue: open‐mindedness.
Danielle Diver
wiley   +1 more source

Justified True Belief + Diachronic Justification: A Contemporary Defence

Philosophies
I defend a diachronic constraint on justification as a necessary condition for knowledge. In my view (JTB + D), a belief is knowledge-apt only if its justification is maintainable over a context-sensitive interval Δ under ordinary avenues of evidence ...
Ahmet Küçükuncular
doaj   +1 more source

The Ethics of Belief Debate and the Norm of Teaching

Educational Theory, Volume 75, Issue 2, Page 374-398, April 2025.
Abstract The debate about the ethics of belief is a classic and it has given rise to wide‐ranging debates in epistemology, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, as well as in ethics. In epistemology, the question is what the norms of belief are — should one believe what is true, what is well‐evidenced, what is pragmatic or what?
Ben Kotzee
wiley   +1 more source

Uma solução não convencional para o Problema de Gettier = A non-conventional solution for the Problem of Gettier

Veritas, 2012
O Problema de Gettier (doravante PG) é um marco na epistemologia contemporânea. Passado meio-século do sismo filosófico causado pelo famoso artigo de Gettier (1963), as réplicas continuam e a discussão em torno do problema reacende-se.
Rodrigues, Luís Estevinha
doaj  

Intuition‐denial and methods teaching: Prediction, reform, and complication

Metaphilosophy, Volume 56, Issue 2, Page 225-238, April 2025.
Abstract According to a popular theory in philosophical methodology, there is a widespread misconception among philosophers as to their own methods. This misconception is that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. This is a fascinating theory, for various reasons.
James Andow
wiley   +1 more source

Senofane e il “non sapere di sapere”

Peitho
An examination of Xenophanes’ fragment DK 21 B 34 shows how it to some extent anticipates what is known in contemporary epistemological debate as the “Gettier problem.” According to the argument underlying this problem, it is not enough to have a ...
Massimo Pulpito
doaj   +1 more source