Results 41 to 50 of about 36,118 (229)

Competitive diplomacy in bargaining and war

open access: yesAmerican Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.
Abstract War is often viewed as a bargaining problem. However, prior to bargaining, countries can vie for leverage by expending effort on diplomacy. This article presents a dynamic model of conflict where agenda‐setting power is endogenous to pre‐bargaining diplomatic competition.
Joseph J. Ruggiero
wiley   +1 more source

Reliability and cost efficiency analysis for deep space habitat network based on Nash bargaining solution

open access: yesTongxin xuebao, 2017
Focusing on the deep space habitat network requirements of high reliability and expensive links,two impact factors to the network performance were regarded as a multi-objective optimization problem,which were network reliability and cost efficiency model,
Zi-jing CHENG   +3 more
doaj   +2 more sources

On the Convergence to the Nash Bargaining Solution for Endogenous Bargaining Protocols [PDF]

open access: yesSSRN Electronic Journal, 2012
We consider non-cooperative multilateral bargaining games with endogenous bargaining protocols. Under an endogenous protocol, the probability with which a player becomes the proposer in a round of bargaining depends on the identity of the player who previously rejected.
Herings P. Jean-Jacques   +2 more
openaire   +3 more sources

Seeing like a citizen: Experimental evidence on how empowerment affects engagement with the state

open access: yesAmerican Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.
Abstract Building a strong and effective state requires revenue. Yet, in many low‐income countries, citizens do not make formal payments to the state or forego engaging with the state altogether due to vulnerability to opportunistic demands by state agents. We study two randomized interventions in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, designed to
Soeren J. Henn   +4 more
wiley   +1 more source

Resolving water security conflicts in agriculture by a cooperative Nash bargaining approach

open access: yesAgricultural Water Management
Water scarcity is increasingly driven by socio-economic dynamics, climate change, and population growth. Conflicts among water users, including states, complicate sustainable water management, necessitating collaborative solutions.
Shahmir Janjua   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

A Strategic Bargaining Game for a Spectrum Sharing Scheme in Cognitive Radio-Based Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks

open access: yesSensors, 2017
In Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), unlicensed users, that is, sensor nodes, have excessively exploited the unlicensed radio spectrum. Through Cognitive Radio (CR), licensed radio spectra, which are owned by licensed users, can be partly or entirely ...
Yuxing Mao   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

On the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution [PDF]

open access: yesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 2006
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Engwerda, J.C., Douven, R.C.M.H.
openaire   +9 more sources

Colonial wars and trade restrictions: Fighting for exclusive trading rights

open access: yesCanadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, EarlyView.
Abstract This paper develops a model of colonial wars and trade restrictions, in which two metropolises compete for control over a colony's trade policy. In equilibrium, the metropolis that gains control can improve its terms of trade by restricting its rival's access to colonial trade.
Ivan G. Lopez Cruz, Gustavo Torrens
wiley   +1 more source

Research on investment-return model of new power system considering financial pressure

open access: yesEnergy Reports, 2023
The investment-return model of power system plays an important part in the business model of power system. In previous studies, the financial pressure brought by the proportion of power project investment was neglected.
Jun Zhang   +4 more
doaj   +1 more source

The Nash Solution and the Utility of Bargaining [PDF]

open access: yesEconometrica, 1978
It has recently been shown that the utility of playing a game with side payments depends on a parameter called strategic risk posture. The Shapley value is the risk neutral utility function for games with side payments. In this paper, utility functions are derived for bargaining games without side payments, and it is shown that these functions are also
openaire   +2 more sources

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