Results 61 to 70 of about 2,427 (238)
Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution [PDF]
Journal of Economic Theory, 2008 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Volker Britz +2 more
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Industrial Relations Journal, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This paper applies the efficiency, equity and voice (EEV) framework to dispute resolution mechanisms in Brazilian banking, empirically extending it in three ways: separating procedural from accessible equity; recognising collective strategic value beyond individual dispute performance; and treating efficiency‐equity trade‐offs as ...
Paulo Marzionna
wiley +1 more source
Sentencing in the Shadow of Promotion: The Impacts of Circuit Court Nomination on Federal Judges
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Judges seek to maximize their own utility, like everyone else. Their goals include job security and promotion. Federal judges lack the electoral incentives that often drive state judges, but they could audition for promotion. I test whether they audition for promotion in their criminal sentencing.
Nicholas Goldrosen
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EnergiesTo address the challenges of renewable energy curtailment under normal conditions and severe power outages under extreme scenarios, this paper proposes a hydrogen-integrated comprehensive energy system (H-IES) configuration method aimed at enhancing the ...
Song Zhang +5 more
doaj +1 more source
Environmental-economic system of bioresource use with asymmetric agents
Transactions of the Karelian Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2016 A discrete time game-theoretic model of an environmental-economic system is considered. Agents (firms or fishermen’s artel cooperatives) that exploit the fish stock on a finite planning horizon are the participants of the game.
Anna Rettieva
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Fairness, Efficiency, and the Nash Bargaining Solution [PDF]
A bargaining solution balances fairness and efficiency if each player's payoff lies between the minimum and maximum of the payoffs assigned to him by the egalitarian and utilitarian solutions.
Rachmilevitch, Shiran
core
Liquidity Crises and the Market‐Maker of Last Resort
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, EarlyView.Abstract We study market illiquidity in an economy subject to nonfundamental shocks. Asset trading occurs via decentralized bargaining. The model has multiple rational expectations equilibria; we associate certain Pareto‐inferior equilibria with liquidity crises.
CHARLES M. KAHN +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Modeling Dynamic Bargaining and Stability in a Star-Shaped Trans-Shipment Network
SystemsThe star-shaped trans-shipment network causes the retailer’s bargaining power to be different, which leads to the misalignment of trans-shipment profit.
Shiyong Peng +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Continuum Nash bargaining solutions
Nonlinear Differential Equations and Applications NoDEAAbstract We compute a mean field limit of Nash bargaining solutions with agents chosen from a smooth probability density and with utility determined by the negative exponential of a cost function. When the cost function has the property that Kantorovich potentials are unique, we show that both at finite stages and
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Policy Biases in a Model with Labor‐Market Frictions
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, EarlyView.Abstract We develop a model with labor‐market matching frictions that is subject to a range of shocks, including shocks to matching efficiency and bargaining power, and use the model to examine how monetary policy should respond to such shocks. We show that optimal monetary policy responds effectively to these shocks, producing economic outcomes that ...
RICHARD DENNIS, TATIANA KIRSANOVA
wiley +1 more source