Results 71 to 80 of about 36,118 (229)

A Fictitious-Play Model of Bargaining To Implement the Nash Solution [PDF]

open access: yes
We present a fictitious-play model of bargaining, where two bargainers play the Nash demand game repeatedly. The bargainers make a deliberate decision on their demands in the initial period and then follow a fictitious play process subsequently.
Younghwan In
core  

Service selection approach for enhancing trustworthiness of Web service

open access: yesTongxin xuebao, 2011
Making use of the game theory,a model of service selection based on Nash bargaining solution was build,and an approach for enhancing Web service trustworthiness was proposed.A bargaining algorithm is designed between ser-vice sides of both complete ...
ZHAO Sheng-hui1   +3 more
doaj   +2 more sources

Joint Channel and Power Allocation Based on Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution in Device-to-Device Communication

open access: yesIEEE Access, 2019
In this paper, a new generalized Nash bargaining framework is proposed for joint channel and power allocation in device-to-device (D2D) communication underlying cellular networks.
Gang Wang, Tanhui Liu, Chenguang Zhao
doaj   +1 more source

A Nash Bargaining Solution for Cooperative Network Formation Games [PDF]

open access: yes, 2011
Le problème de formation des réseaux a reçu une attention croissante ces dernières années. Les travaux précédents ont abordé ce problème supposant que les réseaux soient créés par des utilisateurs égoïstes ; toutefois, ces réseaux peuvent être systématiquement sous-optimaux.
Avrachenkov, Konstantin   +4 more
openaire   +3 more sources

Policy Biases in a Model with Labor‐Market Frictions

open access: yesJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, EarlyView.
Abstract We develop a model with labor‐market matching frictions that is subject to a range of shocks, including shocks to matching efficiency and bargaining power, and use the model to examine how monetary policy should respond to such shocks. We show that optimal monetary policy responds effectively to these shocks, producing economic outcomes that ...
RICHARD DENNIS, TATIANA KIRSANOVA
wiley   +1 more source

Proportional Nash solutions - A new and procedural analysis of nonconvex bargaining problems [PDF]

open access: yes
This paper studies the Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems. The Nash solution in such a context is typically multi-valued. We introduce a procedure to exclude some options recommended by the Nash solution. The procedure is based on the idea of
Xu, Yongsheng, Yoshihara, Naoki
core  

Innovation, Licensing, and Competition: Evidence From Genetically Engineered Crops

open access: yesThe Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We provide a novel empirical analysis of the role of technology licensing, between competitors, for genetically engineered (GE) traits in the US seed industry. We extend the standard differentiated‐product Bertrand pricing model to include trait licensing, which permits us to recover marginal costs and (otherwise unobserved) royalty rates ...
GianCarlo Moschini, Edward D. Perry
wiley   +1 more source

The Determinants of Negotiated Pharmaceutical Prices

open access: yesThe Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We focus on the determinants of pharmaceutical drug prices. Using data from the Brazilian pharmaceutical market, we find large variations in drug prices across buyers, drug classes, and time periods. Our estimation results provide evidence that transaction‐specific determinants between buyers and sellers (e.g., transaction volume, buyer's ...
Ralph B. Siebert   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

A short note on joint welfare maximization assumptions [PDF]

open access: yes
Non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) use the assumption that coalition of signatories maximize their joint welfare.
Dritan Osmani, Richard S.J. Tol
core  

Stability, Fairness and Random Walks in the Bargaining Problem

open access: yes, 2017
We study the classical bargaining problem and its two canonical solutions, (Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky), from a novel point of view: we ask for stability of the solution if both players are able distort the underlying bargaining process by reference to a
Kapeller, Jakob, Steinerberger, Stefan
core   +1 more source

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