Results 91 to 100 of about 3,611,343 (195)
Mergers in the Presence of Adverse Selection
The RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 57, Issue 3, Page 495-514, Autumn (Fall) 2026.ABSTRACT In the presence of adverse selection, mergers can increase welfare through a reduction in inefficient sorting. I characterize the sorting externality internalized between merging firms in a tractable discrete choice model. Mergers benefit consumers when the firms are small, willingness to pay is moderately increasing in cost, and consumer ...
Conor Ryan
wiley +1 more source
The Incidence of Coarse Certification: Evidence From the ENERGY STAR Program
The RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 57, Issue 3, Page 545-585, Autumn (Fall) 2026.ABSTRACT A coarse certification provides simple but incomplete information. Its rationale is to help consumers trade off dimensions of quality that are complex and lack salience. In imperfectly competitive markets, it may induce excess bunching at the certification requirement, crowd out quality, and facilitate price discrimination. Who will ultimately
Sébastien Houde
wiley +1 more source
A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution [PDF]
We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting and Disagreement Point Convexity.
Eyal Winter, Nir Dagan, Oscar Volij
core
Industrial Relations Journal, Volume 57, Issue 5, Page 357-367, September 2026.ABSTRACT This paper applies the efficiency, equity and voice (EEV) framework to dispute resolution mechanisms in Brazilian banking, empirically extending it in three ways: separating procedural from accessible equity; recognising collective strategic value beyond individual dispute performance; and treating efficiency‐equity trade‐offs as ...
Paulo Marzionna
wiley +1 more source
Relative Disagreement-Point Monotonicity of Bargaining Solutions [PDF]
Prominent bargaining solutions are disagreement-point monotonic. These solutions’ disagreement-point monotonicity ranking, on the other hand, is impossible to establish.
Nejat Anbarci
core
EnergiesIn the vigorous development of the power system, to address the economic challenges of multi-microgrid systems, this paper proposes a Nash bargaining model for collaboration between microgrid operators (MGs) and a distribution system operator (DSO) under
Shuai Wang +4 more
doaj +1 more source
Sentencing in the Shadow of Promotion: The Impacts of Circuit Court Nomination on Federal Judges
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Volume 23, Issue 3, Page 359-378, September 2026.ABSTRACT Judges seek to maximize their own utility, like everyone else. Their goals include job security and promotion. Federal judges lack the electoral incentives that often drive state judges, but they could audition for promotion. I test whether they audition for promotion in their criminal sentencing.
Nicholas Goldrosen
wiley +1 more source
Requirements-oriented spectrum sharing for OFDMA cognitive radio networks
Tongxin xuebao, 2015 Considering the satisfaction of the secondary network communication requirements,a two-stage model was proposed to address the spectrum leasing and allocation problem in OFDMA cognitive radio networks(CRN).At the first stage of the model,the secondary ...
Chi ZHANG +3 more
doaj +2 more sources
RPM and Vertical Integration With Upstream Competition and Noncontractible Efforts
The Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume 74, Issue 3, Page 349-366, September 2026.ABSTRACT We study RPM and vertical integration in a common agency setting with two differentiated manufacturers and one retailer, where consumer demand depends on both the manufacturers' and retailer's noncontractible efforts. Under vertical separation, the adoption of maximum RPM by both manufacturers is an equilibrium and intensifies competition ...
Michele Bisceglia +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Biased News Media and the Swing Voter's Decision in Repeated Games
The Manchester School, Volume 94, Issue 5, Page 469-482, September 2026.ABSTRACT We consider a monopolistic, biased news media platform that attempts to influence the decision of swing voters with cheap talk when voting is costly and abstaining is an option. First, we demonstrate that, while no fully communicative equilibrium exists in a stage game, a partially truth‐revealing mixed‐strategy equilibrium exists.
Jooyong Jun, Jeong‐Yoo Kim
wiley +1 more source