Results 111 to 120 of about 2,427 (238)

Non-cooperative Support for the Asymmetric Nash Bargaining solution

open access: yes
Our work contributes to the game-theoretic analysis of bargaining by providing additional non-cooperative support to the well-known Nash bargaining solution.
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques   +2 more
core  

Innovation, Licensing, and Competition: Evidence From Genetically Engineered Crops

open access: yesThe Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume 74, Issue 2, Page 161-180, June 2026.
ABSTRACT We provide a novel empirical analysis of the role of technology licensing, between competitors, for genetically engineered (GE) traits in the US seed industry. We extend the standard differentiated‐product Bertrand pricing model to include trait licensing, which permits us to recover marginal costs and (otherwise unobserved) royalty rates ...
GianCarlo Moschini, Edward D. Perry
wiley   +1 more source

On the Asymptotic Uniqueness of Bargaining Equilibria

open access: yes
This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the equilibria of strategic bargaining games. Several papers in the literature obtain the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as the unique limit of subgame perfect ...
Herings P. Jean-Jacques   +1 more
core   +2 more sources

Hub‐and‐Spoke Collusion With a Third‐Party Pricing Algorithm

open access: yesThe Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume 74, Issue 2, Page 181-196, June 2026.
ABSTRACT A data analytics company delivers an efficiency by supplying a pricing algorithm that allows prices to more effectively respond to demand variation. In this setting, I consider a new form of hub‐and‐spoke collusion: A data analytics company (hub) coordinates the prices of competitors (spokes) through its pricing algorithm.
Joseph E. Harrington Jr.
wiley   +1 more source

Bargaining with an Agenda [PDF]

open access: yes
We propose a new framework for bargaining in which the process follows an agenda. The agenda is represented by a family, parameterized by time, of increasing sets of joint utilities for possible agreements.
Dov Samet   +3 more
core  

The Determinants of Negotiated Pharmaceutical Prices

open access: yesThe Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume 74, Issue 2, Page 234-260, June 2026.
ABSTRACT We focus on the determinants of pharmaceutical drug prices. Using data from the Brazilian pharmaceutical market, we find large variations in drug prices across buyers, drug classes, and time periods. Our estimation results provide evidence that transaction‐specific determinants between buyers and sellers (e.g., transaction volume, buyer's ...
Ralph B. Siebert   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Presumption of Patent Validity and Litigation Incentives

open access: yesJournal of Public Economic Theory, Volume 28, Issue 3, June 2026.
ABSTRACT We analyze the effects of the presumption of patent validity on litigation incentives and outcomes. We develop a litigation game between a patent holder and an alleged infringing firm. A court resolves the dispute if there is a trial. We model the court's decision‐making as a learning process based on evidence and consider the presumption as a
Alice Guerra, Tapas Kundu
wiley   +1 more source

Supply Chain Coordination with Guaranteed Auction Contracts

open access: yesMathematics
This paper investigates the problem of contract coordination in a two-tier multi-unit auction supply chain consisting of a seller and an auction house.
Xinyu Geng, Jiaxin Wang
doaj   +1 more source

The Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution Manipulated by Pre-Donations is Concessionary [PDF]

open access: yes
This study examines the manipulability of simple n-person bargaining problems by pre-donations where the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is operant. We extend previous results on the manipulation of two-person bargaining problems to the n-person case and show
S. Nuray Akin, Murat R. Sertel
core  

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