Results 71 to 80 of about 35,985 (198)
Stability, Fairness and Random Walks in the Bargaining Problem
We study the classical bargaining problem and its two canonical solutions, (Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky), from a novel point of view: we ask for stability of the solution if both players are able distort the underlying bargaining process by reference to a
Kapeller, Jakob, Steinerberger, Stefan
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The Coarse Nash Bargaining Solutions
This paper studies the axiomatic bargaining problem and proposes a new class of bargaining solutions, called coarse Nash solutions. These solutions assign to each problem a set of outcomes coarser than that chosen by the classical Nash solution (Nash, 1950).
Nakada, Satoshu, Nakamura, Kensei
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Relative Disagreement-Point Monotonicity of Bargaining Solutions [PDF]
Prominent bargaining solutions are disagreement-point monotonic. These solutions’ disagreement-point monotonicity ranking, on the other hand, is impossible to establish.
Nejat Anbarci
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In the vigorous development of the power system, to address the economic challenges of multi-microgrid systems, this paper proposes a Nash bargaining model for collaboration between microgrid operators (MGs) and a distribution system operator (DSO) under
Shuai Wang +4 more
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On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules [PDF]
Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well.
Claus-Jochen Haake, Walter Trockel
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Requirements-oriented spectrum sharing for OFDMA cognitive radio networks
Considering the satisfaction of the secondary network communication requirements,a two-stage model was proposed to address the spectrum leasing and allocation problem in OFDMA cognitive radio networks(CRN).At the first stage of the model,the secondary ...
Chi ZHANG +3 more
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Nonconvex bargaining problems [PDF]
This paper studies compact and comprehensive bargaining problems for n players and axiomatically characterize the extensions of the three classical bargaining solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: the Nash solution, the egalitarian solution and the
Xu, Yongsheng, Yoshihara, Naoki
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Learning from a Piece of Pie: the Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining [PDF]
Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is described by a set of parameters ? that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both.
Olivier Donni, Pierre-André Chiappori
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International Negotiations on Climate Change: A Non-cooperative Game Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol [PDF]
We investigate international negotiations on CO2 emissions reduction in the Kyoto Protocol by non-cooperative multilateral bargaining theory. The negotiation model has two phases, (i) allocating emission reductions to countries and (ii) international ...
Okada, Akira
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Proportional Nash solutions - A new and procedural analysis of nonconvex bargaining problems [PDF]
This paper studies the Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems. The Nash solution in such a context is typically multi-valued. We introduce a procedure to exclude some options recommended by the Nash solution. The procedure is based on the idea of
Xu, Yongsheng, Yoshihara, Naoki
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