Results 201 to 210 of about 1,721 (242)

Soft-Constrained Feedback Nash Equilibria

IFAC Proceedings Volumes, 2001
Abstract In this paper we define feedback Nash equilibria in indefinite linear quadratic differential games on an infinite time horizon in a deterministic uncertain environment. The relationship between the existence of such equilibria and solutions of sets of algebraic Riccati equations is investigated.
Engwerda, J.C., van den Broek, W.A., Schumacher, J.M.   +2 more
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Double implementation in Nash and -Nash equilibria

Economics Letters, 2012
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Choice-Nash Equilibria [PDF]

, 2002
We provide existence results for equilibria of games where players employ abstract (non binary) choice rules. Such results are shown to encompass as a relevant instance that of games where players have (non-transitive) SSB (Skew-Symmetric Bilinear) preferences, as will as other well-known transitive (e. g. Nash´s) and non-transitive (e. g.
J. C. R. Alcantud, Carlos Alós-Ferrer
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Reaction Functions as Nash Equilibria

The Review of Economic Studies, 1976
A "reaction function" for the ith firm, xit = i(xt.1), is a decision rule which selects a price for the firm in period t as a function of the observed price vector of period t -1. A Nash [11] non-cooperative equilibrium for this model, in which the equilibrium strategies were reaction functions, would be characterized by n reaction functions (xt), ...,
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Nash Equilibria Mappings

2014
This project was originally designed to study the relations between differential geometry and basic game theory, that is, how games are related to space in which they are played. We discovered that by examining particular surjective strategy maps and special payoff maps between games that Nash Equilibria are invariant under a "redistribution" of the ...
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Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria

International Game Theory Review, 2017
To quantify a player’s commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a “canonical extension,” which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment measure relates to the average overall adjustment probabilities for which the given Nash equilibrium ...
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Treewidth and Pure Nash Equilibria

2013
We consider the complexity of w-PNE-GG, the problem of computing pure Nash equilibria in graphical games parameterized by the treewidth w of the underlying graph. It is well-known that the problem of computing pure Nash equilibria is NP-hard in general, but in polynomial time when restricted to games of bounded treewidth.
Thomas, A., van Leeuwen, J.
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Uncoupled automata and pure Nash equilibria [PDF]

International Journal of Game Theory, 2010
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Convergence of Nash equilibria

1986
The authors introduce a suitable notion of convergence for games, called \({\mathcal N}\)-convergence. This convergence ensures that if each game \(J_ h\) has a Nash solution \(u_ h\), \(J_ h\to^{{\mathcal N}}J_ 0\) and \(u_ h\to u_ 0\), then \(u_ 0\) is a Nash solution for \(J_ 0\); moreover the value of \(J_ 0\) in \(u_ 0=\lim_{h}u_ h\) is the limit ...
E. CAVAZZUTI, PACCHIAROTTI, Nicoletta
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Refined Nash Equilibria

2002
Abstract Subgame Perfection Very broadly, “backwards induction” refers to the idea that any solution to a given “large” problem should induce solutions to all its “small” subproblems. So, any “large” problem can be solved by first solving its “small” subproblems, then replacing the subproblems by their solutions, and finally solving ...
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