Results 91 to 100 of about 137,871 (221)
Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1990 Using lattice-theoretical methods, we analyze the existence and order structure of Nash equilibria of non-cooperative games where payoffs satisfy certain monotonicity properties (which are directly related to strategic complementarities) but need not be quasiconcave.
openaire +3 more sources
A Beautiful Blonde: a Nash coordination game [PDF]
In a memorable scene from the …lm ”A Beautiful Mind,” John Nash explains to his friends how to direct their attentions to women in a bar. Game theorists who have seen the …lm point out that the proposed solution is not a Nash equilibrium.
Maxim Engers, Simon P. Anderson
core
Resource windfalls and political sabotage: Evidence from 5.2 million political ads
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, EarlyView.Abstract We study the role of incentives in inducing sabotage in political contents, vis‐à‐vis natural resource windfalls. The latter induce plausibly exogenous increases in contests' stakes by extending opportunities for policy implementation or private gain upon winning and enhancing incumbent advantage.
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer, Ohad Raveh
wiley +1 more source
Communication, coordination, and surveillance in the shadow of repression
American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.Abstract Communication technology helps protesters organize, but also allows the government to monitor and repress their actions. We study this trade‐off in a model where protesters want to show up at the same time and place, but also want to avoid government forces. If leaders of a movement can send messages observed only by other protesters, they can
Tak‐Huen Chau +2 more
wiley +1 more source
NSun2‐Mediated tsRNAs Alleviate Liver Fibrosis via FAK Dephosphorylation
Cell Proliferation, EarlyView.NSun2 deficiency inhibited sinusoidal capillarization, alleviating liver fibrosis. Reduced NSun2 expression led to alterations in the functional tsRNAs tRF‐1‐S25 and tRF‐5‐V31, which regulate sinusoidal capillarization by targeting key proteins, including DUSP1 and FAK – crucial clinical targets – offering a novel RNA‐based therapeutic approach for ...
Pengcheng Li +14 more
wiley +1 more source
A Re-Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions [PDF]
We define social institutions as strategies in some repeated game. With this interpretation in mind, we consider the impact of introducing requirements on strategies which have been viewed as necessary properties for any social institution to endure. The
Guilherme Carmona
core
Late payments, higher prices? An experimental investigation of competitive procurement
Decision Sciences, EarlyView.Abstract The decision to pay one's supplier late is commonplace across global supply chains and, arguably, a key challenge for many businesses. In a multiple‐methods study, we contribute to the literature by documenting important empirical and anecdotal features about the likelihood and severity of late payments, formulating and solving a theoretical ...
Matthew J. Walker, Kyle Hyndman
wiley +1 more source
Predicting voluntary contributions by “revealed‐preference Nash‐equilibrium”
Economic Inquiry, EarlyView.Abstract One‐shot public‐good situations are prominent in the public debate, and a prime example for behavior diverging from the standard Nash‐equilibrium. Could a Nash‐equilibrium predict one‐shot public‐good behavior in principle? A “revealed‐preference Nash‐equilibrium” (rpne) out‐of‐sample predicts behavior, outperforming other social‐preference ...
Irenaeus Wolff
wiley +1 more source
International Economic Review, EarlyView.ABSTRACT In this paper, I introduce a novel benchmark in games, super‐Nash performance, and a solution concept, optimin, whereby players maximize their minimal payoff under unilateral profitable deviations by other players. Optimin achieves super‐Nash performance in that, for every Nash equilibrium, there exists an optimin where each player not only ...
Mehmet S. Ismail
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Bargaining Foundations for Price Taking in Matching Markets
International Economic Review, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Agents make noncontractible investments before bargaining over who matches with whom and their terms of trade. An agent is a price taker when her investments do not change her potential partners' payoffs. This incentivizes socially optimal investments.
Matthew Elliott, Eduard Talamàs
wiley +1 more source