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Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication [PDF]
The Bayesian persuasion paradigm of strategic communication models interaction between a privately informed sender and an ignorant but rational receiver. The goal is typically to design a (near-)optimal communication (or signaling) scheme for the sender.
Ronen Gradwohl +3 more
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Persuasion with Limited Communication [PDF]
EC16
Shaddin Dughmi +2 more
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Echoes of Persuasion: The Effect of Euphony in Persuasive Communication [PDF]
While the effect of various lexical, syntactic, semantic and stylistic features have been addressed in persuasive language from a computational point of view, the persuasive effect of phonetics has received little attention. By modeling a notion of euphony and analyzing four datasets comprising persuasive and non-persuasive sentences in different ...
Marco Guerini +2 more
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Persuasion with Limited Communication Capacity [PDF]
We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker communicate through an imperfect channel that has a fixed and limited number of messages and is subject to exogenous noise. We provide an upper bound on the payoffs the persuader can secure by communicating through the channel. We also show that the bound is tight, i.e.
Le Treust, Mael, Tomala, Tristan
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And Lead Us (Not) into Persuasion…? Persuasive Technology and the Ethics of Communication [PDF]
The paper develops ethical guidelines for the development and usage of persuasive technologies (PT) that can be derived from applying discourse ethics to this type of technologies. The application of discourse ethics is of particular interest for PT, since 'persuasion' refers to an act of communication that might be interpreted as holding the middle ...
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Mediated (anti)persuasive communication
Can private information or mediation change a sender's behavior and improve the receiver's expected utility in persuasive communication games? In a mediated Bayesian persuasion model, private information cannot improve the receiver's expected utility when the sender communicates it.
Murra-Anton, Zeky, Serrano, Roberto
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A Stochastic Model of Persuasive Communication [PDF]
A source repeatedly communicates a message through a channel so as to persuade a decision-maker to take a favorable action. The decision-maker observes the environment, the message and his cumulative learning experience and stochastically goes through a sequence of information processing states before taking an action.
V. Balachandran, S. D. Deshmukh
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Persuasion with Ambiguous Communication
We explore whether ambiguous communication can be beneficial to the sender in a persuasion problem, when the receiver (and possibly the sender) is ambiguity averse. Our analysis highlights the necessity of using a collection of experiments that form a splitting of an obedient experiment.
Xiaoyu Cheng +3 more
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Persuasion with Coarse Communication
Abstract In many expert–decision maker settings, information is richer than the language used to convey it. Motivated by this communication friction, we study Bayesian persuasion when the sender is constrained to use k messages. We show that the sender’s value is given by a
Yunus C. Aybas, Eray Turkel
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