Results 191 to 200 of about 154,575 (353)

Zero in Phonological Description: Chinese and Burmese [PDF]

open access: bronze, 1970
Vadim B. Kasevich, Nikolai Speshnev
openalex   +1 more source

Polysemy and roots: Deep versus shallow fetching

open access: yesMind &Language, EarlyView.
The paper argues for a model of polysemy based on the blueprint offered by Paul Pietroski whereby the meaning of a lexical item is an instruction to fetch a concept from an address. We show that the bare idea of fetching admits of a deep construal, where a concept is fetched, and a shallow construal, where the instruction merely links a lexical item to
John Collins, Tamara Dobler
wiley   +1 more source

Bridging speech and sight: white matter anatomy in ticker-tape synaesthesia. [PDF]

open access: yesBrain Commun
Delsanti R   +4 more
europepmc   +1 more source

The polysemy of “I”

open access: yesMind &Language, EarlyView.
Orthodoxy assumes that the first‐person thoughts of an individual are anchored to a stable object. I challenge this assumption by arguing that “I” is polysemous. The perspectival anchor of a first‐person thought could be the bearer of the thought, the agent, the bearer of perception, or a body, to name just a few options.
Susanna Schellenberg
wiley   +1 more source

Language comprehension and the rhythm of perception

open access: yesMind &Language, EarlyView.
It is widely agreed that language understanding has a distinctive phenomenology, as illustrated by phenomenal contrast cases. Yet it remains unclear how to account for the perceptual phenomenology of language experience. I advance a rhythmic account, which explains this phenomenology in terms of changes in the rhythm of sensory capacities in both ...
Alfredo Vernazzani
wiley   +1 more source

From modality to millianism

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
Abstract A new argument is offered which proceeds through epistemic possibility (for all S knows, p), cutting a trail from modality to Millianism, the controversial thesis that the semantic content of a proper name is simply its bearer. New definitions are provided for various epistemic modal notions.
Nathan Salmón
wiley   +1 more source

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