Results 31 to 40 of about 1,635,028 (357)
Private Monitoring and Communication in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Games, 2021 This paper provides a model of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which cheap-talk communication is necessary in order to achieve cooperative outcomes in a long-term relationship. The model is one of complete information.
Yu Awaya
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Renegotiation in repeated games [PDF]
Games and Economic Behavior, 1989 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Farrell, Joseph, Maskin, Eric
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On Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable States That Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem. [PDF]
PLoS ONE, 2015 In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the fundamental theory for
Jiawei Li, Graham Kendall
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Repeated Games with Bonuses [PDF]
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2008 This paper deals with 2-player zero-sum repeated games in which player 1 receives a bonus at stage t if he repeats the action he played at stage t-1. We investigate the optimality of simple strategies for player 1. A simple strategy for player 1 consists of playing the same mixed action at every stage, irrespective of past play.
Frank Thuijsman +3 more
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Self-Enforcing Price Leadership
Games, 2021 A dynamic Bertrand-duopoly model where price leadership emerges in equilibrium is developed. In the price leadership equilibrium, a firm leads price changes and its competitor always matches in the next period. The firms produce a homogeneous product and
Gustavo Gudino
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Repeated Games and Networks [PDF]
, 2016 The chapter provides an overview of recent results on infinitely repeated games in which monitoring and interactions are local. The chapter surveys Folk Theorems for games with local monitoring, and results characterizing optimal punishments in separable local public goods games.
Francesco Nava
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Learning in a Hiring Logic and Optimal Contracts
IEEE Access, 2021 This paper examines a hiring logic problem in which all players involved in this game are exposed to scenarios where they can learn from the changes and these modifications influence their preferences; consequently, their decision-making differs from the
Jose Iranildo Sales +1 more
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Reputations in Repeated Games [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013 Abstract This paper surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information. We first develop the adverse-selection approach to reputations in the context of a long-lived player, who may be a “normal” type or one of a number of “commitment” types, and who faces a succession of short-lived players.
Larry Samuelson +2 more
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A Survey on Entropy and Economic Behaviour
Entropy, 2020 Entropy plays a significant role in the study of games and economic behaviour in several ways. A decision maker faced with an n-fold repetition of a decision-making problem needs to apply strategies that become increasingly complex as n increases.
Ziv Hellman, Ron Peretz
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Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Multistage Games
Mathematics, 2023 Direct ESS has some disadvantages, which are seen even in the case of repeated games when the sequence of stage ESSs may not constitute the direct ESS in the repeated game.
Leon A. Petrosyan, Xiuxiu Liu
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