Results 131 to 140 of about 389 (176)

Renewable compensation policies and conventional energy investment: A theoretical model. [PDF]

Heliyon
Ortega Moreno B.
europepmc   +1 more source

How does the Kids SIP<i>smart</i>ER Program Impact the Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Intake of Students: An Investigation beyond Total Treatment Effect in Randomized Controlled Trial. [PDF]

Am J Agric Econ
Abedin N, You W, Reid A, Porter K, Kirkpatrick B, Zoellner J.   +5 more
europepmc   +1 more source

A review of attacker-defender games: Current state and paths forward. [PDF]

Eur J Oper Res
Hunt K, Zhuang J.
europepmc   +1 more source

Analyzing reciprocity dynamics in supply chains of public goods: a stochastic evolutionary game approach. [PDF]

PeerJ Comput Sci
Sun S, Wang M, Lei Y.
europepmc   +1 more source

Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas. [PDF]

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
Hübner V, Staab M, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Kleshnina M.   +4 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.

Related searches:

Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Analysis for Jamming Attacks on Resilient Graphs

2019 American Control Conference (ACC), 2019
A cyber security problem is considered in a networked system formulated as a resilient graph problem based on a game theoretic approach. The connectivity of the underlying graph of the network system is reduced by an attacker who removes some of the edges whereas the defender attempts to recover them.
Quanyan Zhu, Ahmet Cetinkaya, Tomohisa Hayakawa   +2 more
exaly   +2 more sources

Subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in continuous games of almost perfect information

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2000
The author studies a continuous dynamic game \((H_{\infty}, u)\) of almost perfect information defined by the following: There are \(n\) players taking part in the game. At moment \(t=0\) the game starts with a point \(y_0\) from a starting set. Next, in each period \(t=1,2, \ldots\) each player \(i\) chooses independently an action \(y_t^i\), and then
Thomas Mariotti
exaly   +3 more sources

Nash Equilibrium and Subgame Perfection in Observable Queues

Annals of Operations Research, 2002
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Refael Hassin, Moshe Haviv
openaire   +2 more sources

Step-by-Step: The Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium

2020
In a sequential game, subgame perfectness selects equilibria such that players choose mutually best replies not only at the beginning of the game but also in every subgame. Consequentially, neither player has an incentive to deviate from the chosen equilibrium strategy in the course of the game.
Manfred J. Holler, Barbara Klose-Ullmann
openaire   +1 more source