Results 151 to 160 of about 389 (176)
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Subgame Perfect Equilibrium-Based Framework for Counterterror Solution Modeling
2019Game theory is a potential tool to model strategic decision-making environments such as terrorism. Modeling the conflicting strategies of the terror groups and the suppressor governments or military, requires decision-making with a comprehensive estimation of the opponent’s behavior.
Saurabh Ranjan Srivastava +2 more
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A notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty [PDF]
We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the ...
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Existence of subgame perfect equilibrium with public randomization: A short proof [PDF]
Consider a multi-stage game where each player has a compact choice set and payoffs are continuous in all such choices. Harris, Reny and Robson (1995) prove existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium as long as a public correlation device is added to each stage.
Arthur J. Robson, Philip J. Reny
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A partial characterization of a history-dependent, subgame-perfect equilibrium
Economics Letters, 1990Robert D. Cairns, Michel Moreaux
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Subgame Perfect Equilibrium-Based Framework for Counterterror Solution Modeling
Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies, 2020Yogesh Meena +2 more
exaly
Subgame-Perfect ϵ-Equilibria in Perfect Information Games with Common Preferences at the Limit
Mathematics of Operations Research, 2016János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski
exaly
Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2013Indrajit Ray
exaly
Subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic timing games
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2017Jan-Henrik Steg, Frank Riedel
exaly

