Results 81 to 90 of about 18,680 (220)
Resource Management Framework Based on the Stackelberg Game in Vehicular Edge Computing
Complexity, 2020 With the emergence and development of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), quick response time and ultralow delay are required. Cloud computing services are unfavorable for reducing delay and response time.
Guang-Shun Li +5 more
doaj +1 more source
Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods Monopolist: Corrigendum [PDF]
In this paper we make a new analysis of the model presented in Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel (1984). They propose a model in discrete time, such that at each period a new cohort of agents enters the market –each cohort is composed by two types of agents ...
César L. Guerrero Luchtenberg
core
Theoretical Economics, 2017 Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE payoffs: any SPE obtained using public randomization can be
Barelli, Paulo, Duggan, John
openaire +3 more sources
Monotonicity and Robust Implementation Under Forward‐Induction Reasoning
Econometrica, Volume 94, Issue 2, Page 505-536, March 2026.In sequential games, the set of paths consistent with rationality and forward‐induction reasoning may change nonmonotonically when adding transparent restrictions on players' beliefs. Yet, we prove that—in an incomplete‐information environment—predictions become sharper when the restrictions only concern initial beliefs about types.
Pierpaolo Battigalli, Emiliano Catonini
wiley +1 more source
AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part I: definition and properties. [PDF]
We provide a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium which can be applied to arbitrary extensive-form games and is intermediate between subgame-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium.
Giacomo Bonanno
core
A Multi-Step Model for Pie Cutting with Random Offers
MathematicsThe problem of dividing a pie between two persons is considered. An arbitration procedure for dividing the pie is proposed, in which the arbitrator is a random number generator. In this procedure, the arbitrator makes an offer to the players at each step,
Vladimir Mazalov, Vladimir Yashin
doaj +1 more source
Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games
Games, 2010 We introduce consistency of beliefs in the space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi) and use it to provide epistemic conditions for equilibria in finite multi-stage games with observed actions.
Paulo Barelli
doaj +1 more source
The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games [PDF]
Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there
Demichelis, Stefano +2 more
core
NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A MODEL OF MULTIPRODUCT PRICE COMPETITION: AN ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM [PDF]
We study the market interaction of a finite number of single-product firms and a representative buyer, where the buyer consumes bundles of these goods. The buyers' value function determines their willingness to pay for subsets of goods.
Amparo Urbano, Ivan Arribas
core
Trade through endogenous intermediaries [PDF]
We apply an intermediation game of Townsend (1983) to analyze trade in an exchange economy through endogenous intermediaries. In this game, each trader has the opportunity to become an intermediary by oering to buy or sell unlimited quantities of the ...
Kilenthong, Weerachart, Qin, Cheng-Zhong
core +1 more source