Results 1 to 10 of about 464 (200)
On (Subgame Perfect) Secure Equilibrium in Quantitative Reachability Games [PDF]
Logical Methods in Computer Science, 2013 We study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In such games, each player aims at reaching his own goal set of states as soon as possible.
Thomas Brihaye +3 more
doaj +4 more sources
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Rubinstein Bargaining Game with Loss Aversion [PDF]
Complexity, 2019 Rubinstein bargaining game is extended to incorporate loss aversion, where the initial reference points are not zero. Under the assumption that the highest rejected proposal of the opponent last periods is regarded as the associated reference point, we ...
Zhongwei Feng, Chunqiao Tan
doaj +4 more sources
Cournot-Walras Equilibrium as a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium [PDF]
International Journal of Game Theory, 2008 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Francesca Busetto +5 more
+9 more sources
A Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Reinforcement Learning Approach to Time-inconsistent Problems [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021 In this paper, we establish a subgame perfect equilibrium reinforcement learning (SPERL) framework for time-inconsistent (TIC) problems. In the context of RL, TIC problems are known to face two main challenges: the non-existence of natural recursive relationships between value functions at different time points and the violation of Bellman's principle ...
Nixie S. Lesmana, Chi Seng Pun
+7 more sources
Alternating-Offers Bargaining with Nash Bargaining Fairness Concerns [PDF]
Behavioral Sciences, 2023 The Rubinstein alternating-offers bargaining game is reconsidered, where players show fairness concerns and their fairness references are characterized by the Nash bargaining solution.
Zhongwei Feng, Fangning Li, Chunqiao Tan
doaj +2 more sources
On identifying subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes for timing games
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2022 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Jan-Henrik Steg
+5 more sources
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2016 In this paper we provide an exact non-cooperative foundation of the Nash solution via a unique (weakly) subgame perfect equilibrium payoff vector in a two-person bargaining game, which is a modification of the well-known alternate offer game by ...
Papatya Duman, Walter Trockel
doaj +3 more sources
Theoretical Economics, 2021 Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE payoffs: any SPE obtained using public randomization can be
Paulo Barelli, John Duggan
openalex +4 more sources
Undercut-Proof Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of a Pricing Game [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2001 Two firms selling a homogenous product to two types of buyers are involved in a sequential pricing game with zero costs. The pricing strategy available involves a fixed price and a royalty. It is shown that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with positive profits to both firms if and only if buyers differ significantly in their ...
Debabrata Datta, Jaideep Roy
openalex +4 more sources
Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for dynamic pricing competition with finite planning horizon [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2022 Having fixed capacities, homogeneous products and price sensitive customer purchase decision are primary distinguishing characteristics of numerous revenue management systems. Even with two or three rivals, competition is still highly fierce. This paper studies sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of a price competition in an oligopoly market with ...
Niloofar Fadavi
+5 more sources