On (Subgame Perfect) Secure Equilibrium in Quantitative Reachability Games [PDF]
Logical Methods in Computer Science, 2013 We study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In such games, each player aims at reaching his own goal set of states as soon as possible.
Thomas Brihaye +3 more
doaj +5 more sources
Alternating-Offers Bargaining with Nash Bargaining Fairness Concerns [PDF]
Behavioral Sciences, 2023 The Rubinstein alternating-offers bargaining game is reconsidered, where players show fairness concerns and their fairness references are characterized by the Nash bargaining solution.
Zhongwei Feng, Fangning Li, Chunqiao Tan
doaj +2 more sources
Undercut-proof Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of a Pricing Game [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2001 Two firms selling a homogenous product to two types of buyers are involved in a sequential pricing game with zero costs. The pricing strategy available involves a fixed price and a royalty.
Debabrata Datta, Jaideep Roy
core +4 more sources
Infinite subgame perfect equilibrium in the Hausdorff difference hierarchy [PDF]
, 2015 Subgame perfect equilibria are specific Nash equilibria in perfect information games in extensive form. They are important because they relate to the rationality of the players. They always exist in infinite games with continuous real-valued payoffs, but
Roux, Stephane Le
core +4 more sources
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Rubinstein Bargaining Game with Loss Aversion
Complexity, 2019 Rubinstein bargaining game is extended to incorporate loss aversion, where the initial reference points are not zero. Under the assumption that the highest rejected proposal of the opponent last periods is regarded as the associated reference point, we ...
Zhongwei Feng, Chunqiao Tan
doaj +3 more sources
Playing Extensive Games with Learning of Opponent’s Cognition [PDF]
SensorsDecision-making is a basic component of agents’ (e.g., intelligent sensors) behaviors, in which one’s cognition plays a crucial role in the process and outcome.
Chanjuan Liu +3 more
doaj +2 more sources
Cournot–Walras equilibrium as a subgame perfect equilibrium [PDF]
International Journal of Game Theory, 2008 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
BUSETTO, Francesca +2 more
+7 more sources
Simulation of ultimatum game with artificial intelligence and biases
ACI Avances en Ciencias e Ingenierías, 2023 In this research we have developed experimental designs of the ultimatum game with supervised agents. This agents have unbiased and biased thinking depending on the case. We used Reinforcement Learning and Bucket Brigade to program the artficial agentes.
Julio Añasco +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Existence of subgame perfect equilibrium with public randomization: A short proof [PDF]
Economics Bulletin, 2002 Consider a multi-stage game where each player has a compact choice set and payoffs are continuous in all such choices. Harris, Reny and Robson (1995) prove existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium as long as a public correlation device is added to each
Arthur J. Robson, Philip J. Reny
core +1 more source
A Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Reinforcement Learning Approach to Time-inconsistent Problems [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021 In this paper, we establish a subgame perfect equilibrium reinforcement learning (SPERL) framework for time-inconsistent (TIC) problems. In the context of RL, TIC problems are known to face two main challenges: the non-existence of natural recursive relationships between value functions at different time points and the violation of Bellman's principle ...
Nixie Sapphira Lesmana, Chi Seng Pun
openaire +3 more sources