Results 101 to 110 of about 2,716 (210)
Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in stochastic differential games as solution of a generalized Euler Equations System [PDF]
This paper gives a new method to characterize Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in stochastic differential games by means of a set of Generalized Euler Equations.
Rincón-Zapatero, Juan Pablo +1 more
core
Procedurally Fair Taxation [PDF]
We study the implications of procedural fairness on income taxation. We formulateprocedural fairness as a particular non-cooperative bargaining game and examine thestationary subgame perfect equilibria of the game.
Herings P. Jean-Jacques +1 more
core +1 more source
Endogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests. [PDF]
Baik KH, Lee JH, Lee S.
europepmc +1 more source
N-Person Bargaining and Strategic Complexity [PDF]
We investigate the effect of introducing costs of complexity in the n -person unanimity bargaining game. In particular, the paper provides a justification for stationary equilibrium strategies in the class of games where complexity costs matter.
Kalyan Chatterjee, Hamid Sabourian
core
This paper develops a dynamic game-theoretic model to evaluate market competitiveness in industries characterized by price competition and adjustment stickiness.
Ying Zheng, Jiayi Xu, Xiao-Bing Zhang
doaj +1 more source
Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games [PDF]
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, partially, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus,
Indrajit Ray, Susan Snyder
core
Fuzzy-Based Privacy-Preserving Scheme of Low Consumption and High Effectiveness for IoTs: A Repeated Game Model. [PDF]
Cao L, Zhu M.
europepmc +1 more source
Existence of Undominated Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in Extensive Form Games [PDF]
There are games for which all subgame perfect equilibria are such that some (or all) players use weakly dominated strategies. Surely this is undesirable as it diminishes the credibility of equilibria. It is implausible to expect a player to play a weakly
Yilmaz, Ceren
core +1 more source
Persistent Unemployment as Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
The present paper develops some game-theoretic models of a labour market with l firm and n equally productive workers. Although all agents are rational and well-informed, and each of them acts strategically in his own best interest (including the monopsonist firm), unemployment may persist in (subgame perfect) equilibrium for certain combinations of ...
openaire +1 more source
Long-Term Climate Treaties with a Refunding Club. [PDF]
Gersbach H, Hummel N, Winkler R.
europepmc +1 more source

