A Subsidization Scheme for Maximizing Social Welfare in Mobile Communications Markets
In contemporary mobile communications markets, various agents or players interact to pursue welfare. Regulatory policies enacted by governments in certain markets aim to maximize social welfare.
Carlos Agualimpia-Arriaga +4 more
doaj +1 more source
What type of contract should e-tailers offer sellers when facing internal competition. [PDF]
Perlman Y.
europepmc +1 more source
A Notion of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty [PDF]
. We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i.
Sérgio Ribeiro, Costa Werlang
core
A notion of subgame perfect nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty [PDF]
We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i.
Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa
core
Patients' free choice of physicians is not always good. [PDF]
Li X, Li X, Waibel C.
europepmc +1 more source
Country versus pharmaceutical company interests for hepatitis C treatment. [PDF]
Lothan R, Gutman N, Yamin D.
europepmc +1 more source
Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium [PDF]
A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if at any preference profile, the set of all pure and mixed Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f-optimal alternatives at that preference profile.
Mezzetti, Claudio +3 more
core
Existence of equilibria in repeated games with long-run payoffs. [PDF]
Ashkenazi-Golan G +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
Pareto Improvement and Agenda Control of Sequential Financial Innovations [PDF]
In an exchange economy under uncertainty with two periods, one physical good, and finitely many states of the world, we show that for every (complete or incomplete) market span there exists a sequence of securities such that if they are introduced into ...
Chiaki Hara
core
Non-cooperative Support for the Asymmetric Nash Bargaining solution [PDF]
Our work contributes to the game-theoretic analysis of bargaining by providing additional non-cooperative support to the well-known Nash bargaining solution.
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques +2 more
core +1 more source

