Results 131 to 140 of about 2,714 (212)

Research on infrastructure network protection strategy based on bayesian stackelberg game under asymmetric conditions. [PDF]

Sci Rep
Zhang J, Gao Y, Kang W, Tian W, Li Y.
europepmc   +1 more source

Those who can't sort, steal: caste, occupational mobility, and rent-seeking in rural India. [PDF]

J Demogr Economics, 2021
Lawson N, Spears D.
europepmc   +1 more source

A Notion of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty

, 2008
. We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i.
Sérgio Ribeiro, Costa Werlang
core  

Quantum Negotiation Games: Toward Ethical Equilibria. [PDF]

Entropy (Basel)
Smoliński R, Frąckiewicz P, Grzanka K, Szopa M.   +3 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities. [PDF]

Ann Oper Res, 2022
Kóczy LÁ.
europepmc   +1 more source

A notion of subgame perfect nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty

, 1997
We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i.
Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa
core  

Brinkmanship in intragenomic conflict. [PDF]

Proc Biol Sci
Kennedy P, Higginson AD.
europepmc   +1 more source

Endogenous green technology innovation and diffusion with strategic international spillovers. [PDF]

Carbon Balance Manag
Feng Z.
europepmc   +1 more source

Subgame Perfect Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games [PDF]

Subgame Perfect Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games by Pavlo Prokopovych and Lones Smith ABSTRACT This paper investigates discounted infinitely repeated games with observable actions extended with an extensive form correlation device.
Lones Smith, Pavlo Prokopovych
core  

A unified continuous framework for two-player two-strategy games: Game-theoretic analysis of interactions. [PDF]

Fundam Res
Fei X, Yang X.
europepmc   +1 more source