The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games [PDF]
Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there
Demichelis, Stefano +2 more
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Evolution and the ultimatum game: An agent-based model with interbirth intervals and population structure. [PDF]
Schank JC, Miller ML.
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General Framework for the Optimization of the Human-Robot Collaboration Decision-Making Process Through the Ability to Change Performance Metrics. [PDF]
Hani Daniel Zakaria M +3 more
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Research on infrastructure network protection strategy based on bayesian stackelberg game under asymmetric conditions. [PDF]
Zhang J, Gao Y, Kang W, Tian W, Li Y.
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Those who can't sort, steal: caste, occupational mobility, and rent-seeking in rural India. [PDF]
Lawson N, Spears D.
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Quantum Negotiation Games: Toward Ethical Equilibria. [PDF]
Smoliński R +3 more
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Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities. [PDF]
Kóczy LÁ.
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Brinkmanship in intragenomic conflict. [PDF]
Kennedy P, Higginson AD.
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Subgame Perfect Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games [PDF]
Subgame Perfect Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games by Pavlo Prokopovych and Lones Smith ABSTRACT This paper investigates discounted infinitely repeated games with observable actions extended with an extensive form correlation device.
Lones Smith, Pavlo Prokopovych
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