Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games [PDF]
A multi-player Dynkin game is a sequential game in which at every stage one of the players is chosen, and that player can decide whether to continue the game or to stop it, in which case all players receive some terminal payoff.
Eilon, SOLAN, Nicolas, VIEILLE
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A game theoretic approach reveals that discretizing clinical information can reduce antibiotic misuse. [PDF]
Diamant M +6 more
europepmc +1 more source
Bargaining Foundations of the Median Voter Theorem [PDF]
We provide game-theoretic foundations for the median voter theorem in a one-dimensional bargaining model based on Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) model of distributive politics.
John Duggan, Seok-ju Cho
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On the Feedback Solution of a Differential Oligopoly Game with Hyperbolic Demand and Capacity Accumulation [PDF]
I characterise the subgame perfect equilibrium of a differential market game with hyperbolic demand where firms are quantity-setters and accumulate capacity over time à la Ramsey. I show that the open-loop solution is subgame perfect. Then, I analyse the
L. Lambertini
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General Framework for the Optimization of the Human-Robot Collaboration Decision-Making Process Through the Ability to Change Performance Metrics. [PDF]
Hani Daniel Zakaria M +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
On the Asymptotic Uniqueness of Bargaining Equilibria [PDF]
This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the equilibria of strategic bargaining games. Several papers in the literature obtain the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as the unique limit of subgame perfect ...
Herings P. Jean-Jacques +1 more
core +1 more source
Reselling or agency selling? Sales mode selection for a manufacturer in private label competition under information asymmetry. [PDF]
Yang M, Li A, Yang Y.
europepmc +1 more source
Those who can't sort, steal: caste, occupational mobility, and rent-seeking in rural India. [PDF]
Lawson N, Spears D.
europepmc +1 more source
Estimation of Finite Sequential Games [PDF]
I study the estimation of finite sequential games with perfect information. The major challenge in estimation is computation of high-dimensional truncated integration whose domain is complicated by strategic interaction.
Shiko Maruyama
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