Results 141 to 150 of about 464 (200)

A review of attacker-defender games: Current state and paths forward. [PDF]

Eur J Oper Res
Hunt K, Zhuang J.
europepmc   +1 more source

Analyzing reciprocity dynamics in supply chains of public goods: a stochastic evolutionary game approach. [PDF]

PeerJ Comput Sci
Sun S, Wang M, Lei Y.
europepmc   +1 more source

Computing a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of a Sequential Matching Game

Computing a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of a Sequential Matching Game
identifier:oai:t2r2.star.titech.ac.jp ...
openaire  

Subgame perfect equilibrium analysis for jamming attacks on resilient graphs

Subgame perfect equilibrium analysis for jamming attacks on resilient graphs
identifier:oai:t2r2.star.titech.ac.jp ...
openaire  

Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas. [PDF]

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
Hübner V, Staab M, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Kleshnina M.   +4 more
europepmc   +1 more source

A multi-agent system for distributed multi-project scheduling with two-stage decomposition. [PDF]

PLoS One, 2018
Li F, Xu Z.
europepmc   +1 more source

Repeated Game Analysis of a CSMA/CA Network under a Backoff Attack. [PDF]

Sensors (Basel), 2019
Parras J, Zazo S.
europepmc   +1 more source

Evolution of a theory of mind. [PDF]

iScience
Lenaerts T, Saponara M, Pacheco JM, Santos FC.   +3 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Step-by-Step: The Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium

, 2020
In a sequential game, subgame perfectness selects equilibria such that players choose mutually best replies not only at the beginning of the game but also in every subgame. Consequentially, neither player has an incentive to deviate from the chosen equilibrium strategy in the course of the game.
Manfred J. Holler, Barbara Klose-Ullmann
openalex   +2 more sources

A notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty [PDF]

, 2000
We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the ...
Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang
openalex   +2 more sources