Results 51 to 60 of about 13,525 (178)
Trade costs, infrastructure, and dynamics in a global economy
International Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 22, Issue 1, Page 40-62, March 2026.Abstract This study develops a dynamic two‐country model with trade costs linked to international infrastructure stock. With variable markups and firm heterogeneity, the welfare impact of trade costs depends on firms' cost distribution. Governments engage in a dynamic public investment game, leading to multiple steady states. The dynamic equilibrium of
Akihiko Yanase
wiley +1 more source
Perfect uncontrollable differential games [PDF]
, 2004 This paper analyses the time consistency of open-loop equilibria, in the cases of Nash and Stackelberg behaviour. We define a class of games where the strong time-consistency of the open-loop Nash equilibrium associates with the time consistency of ...
Cellini, Roberto +2 more
core +3 more sources
The Manchester School, Volume 94, Issue 2, Page 234-248, March 2026.ABSTRACT This study examines endogenous choices of competition strategies in a vertically related mixed market in which an integrated public firm and a downstream firm, subject to forward passive ownership (FPO) by an input supplier, may engage in R&D investment.
Lili Xu, Yidan Zhang, Sang‐Ho Lee
wiley +1 more source
Dynamic Incentives in Incompletely Specified Environments
Econometrica, Volume 94, Issue 2, Page 375-406, March 2026.Consider a repeated interaction where it is unknown which of various stage games will be played each period. This framework separates the basic logic of intertemporal incentives from the requirement that any given strategy profile yields a well‐defined payoff vector.
Gabriel Carroll
wiley +1 more source
A theoretical model of flock formation to understand trade‐offs between cooperation and competition
Ecosphere, Volume 17, Issue 2, February 2026.Abstract Migratory birds often form flocks during spring migration and compete for territories once they arrive at breeding sites. Understanding the emergence and structure of these flocks has important implications for avian ecology and conservation, as flocking can influence migration success, resource distribution, and population resilience. In this
Chenlan Wang +3 more
wiley +1 more source
NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A MODEL OF MULTIPRODUCT PRICE COMPETITION: AN ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM [PDF]
We study the market interaction of a finite number of single-product firms and a representative buyer, where the buyer consumes bundles of these goods. The buyers' value function determines their willingness to pay for subsets of goods.
Amparo Urbano, Ivan Arribas
core
Strategic Flip‐Flopping in Political Competition
International Economic Review, Volume 67, Issue 1, Page 79-96, February 2026.ABSTRACT We study candidates' position adjustments in response to information about voters' preferences. Repositioning allows candidates to move closer to the median voter, but it incurs financial and electoral costs. In a subgame‐perfect equilibrium, candidates diverge from the center ex ante if the costs of adjustment are sufficiently large.
Gaëtan Fournier +2 more
wiley +1 more source
A Game Theoretic Framework for Quality of Experience Enhancement in Dense Stadia
IEEE Access, 2019 In crowded venues, such as sports stadia, maintaining an acceptable network quality of experience (QoE) is hard to achieve. Installing small cells, distributed antenna systems or high-density WiFi in every stadium is too expensive for mobile network ...
Mohammed S. Bahbahani, Emad Alsusa
doaj +1 more source
Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games [PDF]
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, partially, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus,
Indrajit Ray, Susan Snyder
core
The Quality of Equilibria for Set Packing Games [PDF]
, 2017 We introduce set packing games as an abstraction of situations in which $n$ selfish players select subsets of a finite set of indivisible items, and analyze the quality of several equilibria for this class of games.
de Jong, Jasper, Uetz, Marc
core +2 more sources