Results 81 to 90 of about 13,525 (178)

Implementation of the Recursive Core for Partition Function Form Games [PDF]

In partition function form games, the recursive core (r-core) is implemented by a modified version of Perry and Reny’s (1994) non-cooperative game. Specifically, every stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SSPNE) outcome is an r-core outcome. With
Chen Ying Huang, Tomas Sjostrom
core  

The Rise of the Superstars: Uncovering the Composition Effect of International Trade That Cements the Dominant Position of Big Businesses

Mathematics
International markets are extremely polarised, with a few big superstar businesses operating alongside numerous small competitors, and globalisation has been highlighted as a powerful force behind the superstars’ increasingly dominant presence.
Chara Vavoura
doaj   +1 more source

Endogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests. [PDF]

Soc Choice Welfare, 2022
Baik KH, Lee JH, Lee S.
europepmc   +1 more source

Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with linear costs: A tale of two paradoxes [PDF]

Consider a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with linear cost functions. If the firms produce to stock then no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
Prabal Roy Chowdhury
core  

Price competition and convex costs [PDF]

, 2006
In the original model of pure price competition, due to Joseph Bertrand (1883), firms have linear cost functions. For any number of identical such price-setting firms, this results in the perfectly competitive outcome; the equilibrium price equal the ...
Weibull, Jörgen W.
core  

Other Regarding Preferences: Outcomes, Intentions, or Interdependence [PDF]

The Ultimatum Game seems to be the ideal experiment to test for the structure of preferences or the sequential rationality assumptions underlying subgame perfection. We study the theoretical implications of introducing the possibility of misconceptions -
Halevy, Yoram, Peters, Michael
core  

Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies [PDF]

, 1986
This paper provides a characterization of fully implementable outcomes using undominated Nash equilibrium, i.e. a Nash equilibrium in which no one uses a weakly dominated strategy.
Palfrey, Thomas R., Srivastava, Sanjay
core  

A Cellular Market Model for Social Welfare Maximization Through a Subsidization Scheme

IEEE Access
In cellular communications markets, various stakeholders interact while considering regulatory policies enacted by governments to maximize social welfare.
Carlos Agualimpia-Arriaga, Carlos Paez, Arturo Fajardo, Brijesh Soni, Jose Vuelvas, Siddhartan Govindasamy   +5 more
doaj   +1 more source

Long-Term Climate Treaties with a Refunding Club. [PDF]

Environ Resour Econ (Dordr), 2021
Gersbach H, Hummel N, Winkler R.
europepmc   +1 more source

Mechanism design with partially-specified participation games [PDF]

This paper considers the implementation of an economic outcome under complete information when the strategic and informational details of the participation game are partially-specified.
Laurent Lamy
core