Results 151 to 160 of about 741,872 (173)
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
Why do children pass in the centipede game? Cognitive limitations v. risk calculations
Games Econ. Behav.Children and adolescents from 8 to 16 years old play the centipede game in the laboratory, where non-equilibrium behavior (passing) can occur for two reasons: an inability to backward induct (cognitive limitation) or a decision to best respond to the ...
I. Brocas, J. Carrillo
semanticscholar +1 more source
IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics
As 6G technology continues to evolve, future communication systems demand extremely low latency, improved energy efficiency, and support for massive device connectivity.
Lijun Dai +4 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
As 6G technology continues to evolve, future communication systems demand extremely low latency, improved energy efficiency, and support for massive device connectivity.
Lijun Dai +4 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Matching Best Replies in the Centipede Game [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008 By applying their Best-Reply Matching (BRM) equilibrium concept to the well known finite centipede game, Droste, Kosfeld & Voorneveld DKV (2003) showed that players continue the game with large probability. In this paper we build on their work by first showing that the BRM equilibria differ whether one works with the normal or with the reduced normal ...
openaire +2 more sources
Overt and Underlying Games : The Case of the Centipede
Rivista internazionale di scienze sociali : 1, 2010, 2010Making use of and following substantive rationality is a costly and not always feasible option. In games, this option generates two levels of reasoning. The player has to decide how to play the overt game, but this requires him to decide how to play an underlying game in which the alternatives are to follow either substantive rationality or a different
openaire +2 more sources
Bounded Rationality in the Centipede Game
Episteme, 2011AbstractNormative game theory unsatisfactorily explains rational behavior. Real people do not behave as predicted, and what is prescribed as rational behavior is normally unattainable in real-life. The problem is that current normative analysis does not account for people's cognitive limitations – their bounded rationality. However, this paper develops
openaire +1 more source
Hot versus cold behavior in centipede games
Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2020AbstractThere is a long-standing unresolved debate in game theory and experimental economics regarding the behavioral equivalence of the direct-response method (hot play) and the strategy method (cold play). Using a unified experimental framework, we compare behavior elicited via both methods in four different Centipede Games that differ in their ...
Bernardo García-Pola +2 more
openaire +1 more source
Behavioral analysis in the agent-based simulation of centipede games
The 6th International Conference on Soft Computing and Intelligent Systems, and The 13th International Symposium on Advanced Intelligence Systems, 2012The aim of this paper is to explain behavior of the human subjects in several laboratory experiments of centipede game which are different from the equilibrium solution. A centipede game is a dynamic game which multiple players make decision in prearranged order.
Tomohiro Hayashida +2 more
openaire +1 more source
International Conference on Service Operations and Logistics, and Informatics, 2012
Le Zhang, Hui‐Min Wang, Jin-ping Tong
exaly +3 more sources
Le Zhang, Hui‐Min Wang, Jin-ping Tong
exaly +3 more sources
Cooperation in an Infinite-Horizon Centipede Game
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2006An infinite-horizon perfect-information "centipede" game is studied. The unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in pure strategies has each player choose, at each opportunity, to terminate the game. In contrast, mixed strategies can yield equilibrium cooperation described as follows: for all but finitely many periods players randomize between ...
openaire +1 more source