Results 11 to 20 of about 741,872 (173)
Ambiguity and the Centipede Game: Strategic Uncertainty in Multi-Stage Games [PDF]
We propose a solution concept for a class of extensive form games with ambiguity. Specifically we consider multi-stage games. Players have CEU preferences. The associated ambiguous beliefs are revised by Generalized Bayesian Updating. We assume individuals take account of possible changes in their preferences by using consistent planning.
Eichberger, Jürgen +2 more
openaire +3 more sources
Availability of Information and Representation Effects in the Centipede Game [PDF]
The paper presents the results of a novel experiment testing the effects of environment complexity on strategic behavior, using a centipede game. Behavior in the centipede game has been explained either by appealing to failures of backward induction or by calling for preferences that induce equilibria consistent with observed behavior.
Paolo Crosetto, Marco Mantovani
openaire +4 more sources
Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game
We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests each of his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest. In the centipede game, thesebest experienced payoff dynamicslead to cooperative play.
Sandholm, William H. +2 more
openaire +6 more sources
Far but finite horizons promote cooperation in the Centipede game
Abstract The sequential Centipede game models repeated reciprocal interaction, in which two players alternate in choosing between cooperation and defection. In an attempt to increase the game’s applicability to real-life decision contexts, we investigated the effects of game length and termination rules on cooperation in the Centipede game.
Eva M. Krockow +2 more
semanticscholar +4 more sources
On Replication and Perturbation of the McKelvey and Palfrey Centipede Game Experiment [PDF]
Abstract This study first replicates, then perturbs, the centipede game as implemented by McKelvey and Palfrey (1992). It is thus both a replication study and an original research study. We use controlled laboratory experiments, with computer interfaces for each treatment, anonymous round-robin matching among the subjects across ...
James C. Cox, Duncan James
openaire +2 more sources
"Test two, choose the better" leads to high cooperation in the Centipede game
Explaining cooperative experimental evidence in the Centipede game constitutes a challenge for rational game theory. Traditional analyses of Centipede based on backward induction predict uncooperative behavior.
Segismundo S. Izquierdo, L. Izquierdo
semanticscholar +1 more source
Non-equilibrium play in centipede games
Centipede games represent a classic example of a strategic situation, where the equilibrium prediction is at odds with human behavior. This study is explicitly designed to discriminate among the proposed explanations for initial responses in centipede games.
Bernardo García-Pola +2 more
openaire +2 more sources
Level-k analysis of experimental centipede games [PDF]
Abstract As one of the best-known examples of the paradox of backward induction, centipede games have prompted a host of studies with various approaches and explanations ( McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992 , Fey et al., 1996 , Nagel and Tang, 1998 , Rapoport et al., 2003 , Palacios-Huerta and Volij, 2009 ).
Toshiji Kawagoe, Hirokazu Takizawa
openaire +1 more source
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become widespread in the delivery of public services. This study explores behavioral mechanisms of building and eroding trust in partnering across sectors at the micro-level of interaction between public and ...
Kristina S. Weißmüller, Rick Vogel
semanticscholar +1 more source
Competitive Centipede Games: Zero-End Payoffs and Payoff Inequality Deter Reciprocal Cooperation
Reciprocal cooperation can be studied in the Centipede game, in which two players alternate in choosing between a cooperative GO move and a non-cooperative STOP move.
Eva M. Krockow +2 more
doaj +1 more source

