Results 11 to 20 of about 126,289 (334)

Distributive Justice and CEO Compensation [PDF]

open access: yesActa Sociologica, 2007
This article develops a framework for studying individuals' ideas about what constitutes just compensation for chief executive officers (CEOs) and reports estimates of just CEO pay and the principles guiding ideas of justice. The sample consists of students pursuing a Master of Business Administration (MBA) degree in Sweden and the United States.
Guillermina Jasso   +1 more
core   +7 more sources

Stock Option Compensation and Managerial Turnover [PDF]

open access: yesRevista de Management Comparat International, 2009
This study examines the association between managerial turnover and equity-based compensation. I investigate whether stock options act to bond executives to their firms and whether retention of managers is a motivation of companies in designing CEO ...
Raluca Georgiana NĂSTĂSESCU
doaj   +3 more sources

Impact of Executive Compensation, CEO Compensation and Board Diversity on Organizational Performance with Moderating Effect of Systemic Factors

open access: yesJournal of Business and Social Review in Emerging Economies, 2022
Purpose: Current research intended to probe the impact of executive compensation, CEO compensation and diversity on the organizational financial performance with the moderating role of systemic factors.
Shoukat Malik, Noorulain Waheed
doaj   +1 more source

Impact of Managerial Ability and Power on CEOs Compensation

open access: yesApplied Finance Letters, 2020
The present study aims to test whether the rent extraction or efficient contracting which significantly influences the compensation of CEOs in Indian companies.
Srikanth Potharla
doaj   +1 more source

CEO Power, Compensation, and Governance [PDF]

open access: yesSSRN Electronic Journal, 2007
This paper presents a contracting model of governance based on the premise that CEOs are the main promoters of governance change. CEOs use their pow-er to extract higher pay or private benefits, and different governance structures are preferred by different CEOs as they favor one or the other type of compen-sation.
Albuquerque, Rui, Miao, Jianjun
openaire   +4 more sources

CEO Compensation in Korea: Is It Different than in the US? A Comparison between Korean Non-Life Insurance Firms and US Property-Liability Insurance Firms

open access: yesInternational Journal of Financial Studies, 2021
This study investigates the level, structure, and pay-for-performance relationship of CEO compensation in Korean non-life insurance companies. We find that seniority plays an important role in setting CEO compensation practices and that performance-based
Sangyong Han, Hyejeong Mun
doaj   +1 more source

Peer choice in CEO compensation [PDF]

open access: yesJournal of Financial Economics, 2009
Current research shows that firms are more likely to benchmark against peers that pay their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) higher compensation, reflecting self serving behavior. We propose an alternative explanation: the choice of highly paid peers represents a reward for unobserved CEO talent. We test this hypothesis by decomposing the effect of peer
Albuquerque, Ana M.   +2 more
openaire   +4 more sources

CEO Compensation: Evidence from the Field [PDF]

open access: yesSSRN Electronic Journal, 2021
We survey directors and investors on the objectives, constraints, and determinants of CEO pay. 67% of directors would sacrifice shareholder value to avoid controversy on CEO pay, implying they face significant constraints other than participation and incentive compatibility.
Edmans, Alex, Gosling, Tom, Jenter, Dirk
openaire   +4 more sources

Does hometown connection between chairmen and CEOs improve compensation–performance sensitivity in China?

open access: yesHumanities & Social Sciences Communications, 2023
Based on a the micro dataset set of private Chinese-listed companies, this study examines the in detail the impact of hometown connections between chief executive officers (CEOs) and chairmen on CEO compensation–performance sensitivity.
Di Wang   +4 more
doaj   +1 more source

CEO talent, CEO compensation, and product market competition [PDF]

open access: yesJournal of Financial Economics, 2011
We develop a structural industry equilibrium model to show how competitive CEO-firm matching and product markets jointly determine firm value and CEO pay. We analytically derive testable implications for the effects of product market characteristics on firm size, CEO pay, and CEO impact on firm value. CEO talent matters more in more competitive markets
Hae Won (Henny) Jung, Ajay Subramanian
openaire   +1 more source

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