Results 41 to 50 of about 484,295 (198)
Energies, 2018 The efficiency of a power system is reduced when voltage drops and losses occur along the distribution lines. While the voltage profile across the system buses can be improved by the injection of reactive power, increased line flows and line losses could
Ikponmwosa Idehen +2 more
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“MILITANCY” CONCEPT-SPHERE’S SEMIOLINGUISTIC ACTUALIZATION IN ADVERTISING DISCOURSE
Вестник Волгоградского государственного университета: Серия 2. Языкознание, 2020 The paper focuses on the clusters of signs that support semiosis of belligerency and contribute to actualization of the concept-sphere “Militancy” in creolized advertising texts.
Daria G. Kurenova, Andrey V. Olyanich
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, 1983 The most general model used to describe conflict situations is the extensive form model, which specifies in detail the dynamic evolution of each situation and thus provides an exact description of ‘who knows what when’ and ‘what is the consequence of which’.
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Strategic negotiations for extensive-form games [PDF]
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2019 When studying extensive-form games it is commonly assumed that players make their decisions individually. One usually does not allow the possibility for the players to negotiate their respective strategies and formally commit themselves to future moves.
Dave de Jonge, Dongmo Zhang
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Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation [PDF]
A valuation for a board game is an assignment of numeric values to different states of the board. The valuation reflects the desirability of the states for the player. It can be used by a player to decide on her next move during the play.
Dov Samet, Philippe Jehiel
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Robust Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games and Extension to Limited Lookahead
, 2016 Stackelberg equilibria have become increasingly important as a solution concept in computational game theory, largely inspired by practical problems such as security settings. In practice, however, there is typically uncertainty regarding the model about
Linping Zhang (1982398) +4 more
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No-Regret Learning in Extensive-Form Games with Imperfect Recall [PDF]
, 2012 Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is an efficient no-regret learning algorithm for decision problems modeled as extensive games. CFR's regret bounds depend on the requirement of perfect recall: players always remember information that was revealed
Marc Lanctot +5 more
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Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Muraviev, Igor +2 more
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Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior [PDF]
We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties and prove existence.Unawareness, extensive-
Aviad Heifetz +2 more
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Quasi-Perfect Stackelberg Equilibrium
, 2018 Equilibrium refinements are important in extensive-form (i.e., tree-form) games, where they amend weaknesses of the Nash equilibrium concept by requiring sequential rationality and other beneficial properties.
Farina, Gabriele +4 more
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