Results 21 to 30 of about 156 (155)

Mistreating Consent

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 112, Issue 2, Page 544-560, March 2026.
ABSTRACT Consent plays an important role in our lives. Using someone's body or property without their consent is typically a serious wrong. However, there are various ways in which consensual interactions may be morally deficient. This paper articulates an underexplored way in which consent can be defective, namely by being moot.
Elise Woodard
wiley   +1 more source

Preservationism in Memory

Ratio, Volume 39, Issue 1, Page 10-16, March 2026.
ABSTRACT Preservationism in the philosophy of memory is dead, according to many. This opinion is not ill‐founded. It appears to be justified both by common sense and by empirical psychology. But in what follows we explain how and why an independently motivated form of preservationism, modal preservationism, survives.
Sven Bernecker, Paul Silva Jr
wiley   +1 more source

Teaching Students to Understand Knowledge: Stress‐Testing the ‘Justified True Belief Account’ for Critical Thinking

Future in Educational Research, Volume 3, Issue 4, Page 569-579, December 2025.
ABSTRACT This conceptual essay, grounded in a close reading of Plato's Theaetetus, argues that before educators can effectively operationalise critical thinking as the rigorous evaluation ('stress‐testing') of competing knowledge claims, university students must first understand foundational epistemological principles rooted in Plato's tripartite ...
Gerry Dunne
wiley   +1 more source

Os anulabilismos de Klein e de Swain e o problema de Gettier

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, 2010
In this essay, we intend to show that Peter Klein and Marshall Swain defeasibility theories do not resolve the Gettier problem. Klein postulates, to any Gettier counterexample, that there is a true proposition which, when associated with evidence-e of S,
Emerson Carlos Valcarenghi
doaj  

Implications of Rejecting Common‐Sense Realism for the Practice and Aim of Knowledge‐Based Education

Educational Theory, Volume 75, Issue 6, Page 1107-1129, December 2025.
Abstract In this article, I assume that it is universally accepted that education—at least sometimes—should aim at knowledge. Moreover, I take my point of departure from the classical (and minimal) definition of knowledge in terms of justified true belief (JTB).
Henrik Friberg‐Fernros
wiley   +1 more source

On the significance of L. Zagzebski’s results for solving the Gettier problem

Интеллект. Инновации. Инвестиции
The article is devoted to the analysis of the authoritative research results of L. Zagzebski on the Gettier problem, which has not been solved for many years.
R. A. Yartsev
doaj   +1 more source

Anti-luck epistemology and the Gettier problem [PDF]

Philosophical Studies, 2014
A certain construal of the Gettier problem is offered, according to which this problem concerns the task of identifying the anti-luck condition on knowledge. A methodology for approaching this construal of the Gettier problem—anti-luck epistemology—is set out, and the utility of such a methodology is demonstrated.
openaire   +3 more sources

Knowledge first, all the way down

Philosophical Investigations, Volume 48, Issue 4, Page 363-376, October 2025.
Abstract Knowledge‐first philosophy has fewer adherents than it should. It has the potential to address many of the common problems facing epistemologists, but it is counter‐intuitive in some respects. In this paper, I make the case that the underlying metaphysics of Timothy Williamson's account of knowledge‐first is responsible for some of this ...
Tess Dewhurst
wiley   +1 more source

Epistemic Relativism and the Gettier Problem

Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2022
The aim of this article is to present a variant of epistemic relativism that is compatible with a language practice especially popular among scientists. We argue that in science, but also in philosophy, propositions are naturally ‘relativized’ to sets of hypotheses or theories, and that a similar language practice allows one to interpret canonical ...
Louis Vervoort, Alexander A. Shevchenko
openaire   +1 more source

Referential Understanding, Luck, and Knowledge of Reference

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 111, Issue 2, Page 590-606, September 2025.
Abstract In some cases of communication, the hearer misunderstands the referential part of the speaker's utterance although she identifies the speaker's referent. What more is needed for referential understanding? One view is that the hearer must know what the speaker refers to.
Victor Tamburini
wiley   +1 more source