Results 81 to 88 of about 8,998,040 (88)
On continuous ordinal potential games [PDF]
If the preferences of the players in a strategic game satisfy certain continuity conditions, then the acyclicity of individual improvements implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
Kukushkin, Nikolai S.
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Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games [PDF]
It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game.
Oechssler, Joerg +2 more
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Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation [PDF]
A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally.
Rod Garratt +3 more
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Static Stability in Games [PDF]
Static stability of equilibrium in strategic games differs from dynamic stability in not being linked to any particular dynamical system. In other words, it does not make any assumptions about off-equilibrium behavior.
Igal Milchtaich
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Skill and Strategy in Games. [PDF]
This thesis consists of two parts. Part I deals with relative skill and the role of random factors in games. Part II is devoted to the computation of optimal strategies in two interesting classes of games: poker and take-and-guess games.
Dreef, M.R.M.
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, 2008 We introduce a new class of games---asynchronous congestion games (ACGs). In an ACG, each player has a task that can be carried out by any element of a set of resources, and each resource executes its assigned tasks in a random order.
Polukarov, Maria +2 more
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Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race game [cartographic material] : for 2 or more players.
, 1960 Also available online http://nla.gov.au/nla.map ...
Quality Games Pty. Ltd.
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The Cutting Power of Preparation [PDF]
In a strategic game, a curb set [Basu and Weibull, Econ.Letters 36 (1991) 141-146] is a product set of pure strategies containing all best responses to every possible belief restricted to this set.Prep sets [Voorneveld, Games Econ. Behav.
Voorneveld, M., Tercieux, O.R.C.
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