Results 41 to 50 of about 18,680 (220)
Economic Harmony—A Rational Theory of Fairness and Cooperation in Strategic Interactions
Experimental studies show that the Nash equilibrium and its refinements are poor predictors of behavior in non-cooperative strategic games. Cooperation models, such as ERC and inequality aversion, yield superior predictions compared to the standard game ...
Ramzi Suleiman
doaj +1 more source
Perfect Regular Equilibrium [PDF]
We propose a revised version of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in general multi-period games with observed actions. In finite games, perfect Bayesian equilibria are weakly consistent and subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
hanjoon michael, jung/j
core
Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail?
ABSTRACT Pay‐TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit.
David Martimort, Jerome Pouyet
wiley +1 more source
Competitive diplomacy in bargaining and war
Abstract War is often viewed as a bargaining problem. However, prior to bargaining, countries can vie for leverage by expending effort on diplomacy. This article presents a dynamic model of conflict where agenda‐setting power is endogenous to pre‐bargaining diplomatic competition.
Joseph J. Ruggiero
wiley +1 more source
Resource Competition in Blockchain Networks Under Cloud and Device Enabled Participation
Blockchain technology is a promising resource management architecture due to its ability of building trust in a decentralized transaction. Block mining participants, i.e. miners, are incentivized with reward for successfully mining blocks. Unfortunately,
Yuxiang Liang +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Cross‐Ownership and Welfare‐Inferior Price Competition with Relative Profit Delegation Contracts
ABSTRACT We consider management reward contracts based on relative profit performance under cross‐ownership and find nonequivalence of price and quantity competition. We also examine an endogenous choice of competition mode under unilateral cross‐ownership and show that the welfare‐inferior price competition can appear unless the product's ...
Mingqing Xing, Sang‐Ho Lee
wiley +1 more source
FogCom:SDN-enabled fog node selection for early detection of communicable diseases
A communicable illness is one that spreads from person to person by a number of means, including contact with blood and body fluids, inhaling an airborne virus, or being bitten by an insect.
Joy Lal Sarkar +8 more
doaj +1 more source
Stochastic Differential Games for Which the Open-Loop Equilibrium is Subgame Perfect
It is generally admitted that a correct forecasting of uncertain variables needs Markov decision rules. In a dynamic game environment, this belief is reinforced if one focuses on credible actions of the players. Usually, subgame perfectness requires equilibrium strategies to be constructed on Markov rules.
Ricardo Josa-Fombellida +1 more
openaire +2 more sources
Cross‐border reciprocal bartering in public–private tetradic networks
Abstract Under the background of semiconductor and vaccine shortages during COVID‐19‐driven supply chain disruptions, this article adopts a multimethodological approach to investigate strategic solutions for cross‐border scarce goods bartering in a public–private (P–P) tetradic reciprocal network, which involves two pairs of P–P collaborative dyads ...
Jiuh‐Biing Sheu +2 more
wiley +1 more source
BACKWARD INDUCTION: MERITS AND FLAWS
Backward induction (BI) was one of the earliest methods developed for solving finite sequential games with perfect information. It proved to be especially useful in the context of Tom Schelling’s ideas of credible versus incredible threats.
Kamiński Marek M.
doaj +1 more source

