Results 51 to 60 of about 18,680 (220)
An Approximate Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium Computation Technique for Repeated Games
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2010 This paper presents a technique for approximating, up to any precision, the set of subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) in repeated games with discounting. The process starts with a single hypercube approximation of the set of SPE payoff profiles. Then the initial hypercube is gradually partitioned on to a set of smaller adjacent hypercubes,
Burkov, Andriy, Chaib-draa, Brahim
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Solution of mathematical programming formulations of subgame perfect equilibrium problems [PDF]
, 1992 Mathematical programming models have been developed to represent imperfectly competitive (oligopolistic) market structures and the interdependencies of decision-making units in establishing prices and production levels. The solution of these models represents an economic equilibrium.
Macal, C. M., Hurter, A. P.
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Bank Capital and Misconduct Incentives
Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This paper studies large banks' incentives to engage in misconduct by abusing their dominant position in the market for loans and by mis‐selling an add‐on financial product to depositors. We draw new connections between stability‐focused prudential regulation and misconduct by studying the impact of higher capital requirements on misconduct ...
Jacob Seifert
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Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games [PDF]
, 2014 We introduce a notion of subgames for stochastic timing games and the related notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium in possibly mixed strategies. While a good notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium for continuous-time games is not available in general, we
Riedel, Frank, Steg, Jan-Henrik
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Buyer Power and the Effect of Vertical Integration on Innovation
Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Our article investigates the impact of vertical integration (without foreclosure) on innovation. We compare cases where either (i) two manufacturers or (ii) a manufacturer and a vertically integrated retailer invest. Then, the independent manufacturer(s) and the retailer bargain over nonlinear contracts before selling to consumers.
Claire Chambolle, Morgane Guignard
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Subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with deterministic procedures [PDF]
Theory and Decision, 2016 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Serial Investing and Strategic Commitment in Markets With Unknown Competitors
Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We study how serial investors who regularly face unknown competitors attempt to make their projects dominant. Innovating in new markets often involves uncertainty over the nature of the final product and who the key competitors will be. Such projects also have long‐term funding needs, so a commitment to provide the necessary funds imparts a ...
Naveen Khanna, Richmond Mathews
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Invitation Games: An Experimental Approach to Coalition Formation
Games, 2021 This paper studies how to form an efficient coalition—a group of people. More specifically, we compare two mechanisms for forming a coalition by running a laboratory experiment and reveal which mechanism leads to higher social surplus. In one setting, we
Takaaki Abe +2 more
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Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium for Dynamic Pricing Competition with Finite Planning Horizon
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2022 Having fixed capacities, homogeneous products and price sensitive customer purchase decision are primary distinguishing characteristics of numerous revenue management systems. Even with two or three rivals, competition is still highly fierce. This paper studies sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of a price competition in an oligopoly market with ...
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Leader‐Follower Dynamics in Shareholder Activism
The Journal of Finance, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We propose a theory of coordination and influence among blockholders. Privately informed activists time their trades in sequence to lower acquisition costs, prompting a strategic use of order flows: leader activists create trading gains for their followers, ultimately influencing their willingness to bear greater value‐enhancing intervention ...
DORUK CETEMEN +3 more
wiley +1 more source