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Subgame Perfect Equilibrium-Based Framework for Counterterror Solution Modeling
, 2019 Game theory is a potential tool to model strategic decision-making environments such as terrorism. Modeling the conflicting strategies of the terror groups and the suppressor governments or military, requires decision-making with a comprehensive estimation of the opponent’s behavior.
Saurabh Ranjan Srivastava +2 more
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Nash Equilibrium and Subgame Perfection in Observable Queues
Annals of Operations Research, 2002zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Hassin, Refael, Haviv, Moshe
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Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions
Games and Economic Behavior, 1990zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Friedman, James W., Samuelson, Larry
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An Evolutionary Model of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
2023Classical game theory begins with the assumption that its agents are rational, and proceeds to find various solution concepts from these premises. These solution concepts are often interpreted as the rational way to behave in games. However, this method often faces normative (and empirical) concerns on the validity of its rationality assumptions.
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Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Implementation Costs
Journal of Economic Theory, 1995zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Neme, Alejandro, Quintas, Luis
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Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium: A Learning Approach via Costs to Move
Dynamic Games and Applications, 2018zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Caruso, Francesco +2 more
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On the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in infinite-action games of perfect information
Journal of Economic Theory, 1987We study infinite-action games of perfect information with finitely or countably many players. It is assumed that payoff functions are continuous, strategy sets are compact, and constraint correspondences are continuous. Under these assumptions we prove the existence of subgame- perfect equilibria in pure strategies which are measurable functions.
Hellwig, Martin, Leininger, Wolfgang
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2015
For general extensive-form games with or without perfect information, subgame perfect equilibrium is defined. Various repeated games are analyzed, and Perfect Folk Theorem is proved.
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For general extensive-form games with or without perfect information, subgame perfect equilibrium is defined. Various repeated games are analyzed, and Perfect Folk Theorem is proved.
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Subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in continuous games of almost perfect information
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2000The author studies a continuous dynamic game \((H_{\infty}, u)\) of almost perfect information defined by the following: There are \(n\) players taking part in the game. At moment \(t=0\) the game starts with a point \(y_0\) from a starting set. Next, in each period \(t=1,2, \ldots\) each player \(i\) chooses independently an action \(y_t^i\), and then
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Computing a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of a Sequential Matching Game
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018We study a decentralized matching market in which each firm sequentially makes offers to potential workers. For each offer, the worker can choose "accept" or "reject," but the decision is irrevocable. The acceptance of an offer guarantees her job at the firm, but it may also eliminate chances of better offers from other firms in the future.
Yasushi Kawase +2 more
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