Results 31 to 40 of about 18,680 (218)
On gamesmen and fair men: explaining fairness in non-cooperative bargaining games [PDF]
Royal Society Open Science, 2018 Experiments on bargaining games have repeatedly shown that subjects fail to use backward induction, and that they only rarely make demands in accordance with the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Ramzi Suleiman
doaj +1 more source
The Complexity of Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Quantitative Reachability Games [PDF]
Logical Methods in Computer Science, 2020 We study multiplayer quantitative reachability games played on a finite directed graph, where the objective of each player is to reach his target set of vertices as quickly as possible.
Thomas Brihaye +4 more
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Exploring the Gap between Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium
Games, 2016 In (Bonanno, 2013), a solution concept for extensive-form games, called perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), was introduced and shown to be a strict refinement of subgame-perfect equilibrium; it was also shown that, in turn, sequential equilibrium (SE) is
Giacomo Bonanno
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A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game
Games, 2020 In the much-studied Centipede Game, which resembles the Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma, two players successively choose between (1) cooperating, by continuing play, or (2) defecting and terminating play.
Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour
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Simulation of the Stackelberg–Hotelling Game
GamesThis work studies the Hotelling game with sequential choice of prices, that is, the Stackelberg–Hotelling (SHOT) game. The game is studied through numerical simulation, which provides the subgame perfect equilibrium solution not only in the unrestricted ...
Luis Garcia-Perez +3 more
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Theoretical Economics, 2017 Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE payoffs: any SPE obtained using public randomization can be
Barelli, Paulo, Duggan, John
openaire +3 more sources
The RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We study a long‐horizon, oligopolistic market with random shocks to demand that can be arbitraged by two storage operators with finite capacity. This problem applies to any storable commodity—that is, most commodities. Because the arbitrage spread is so sensitive to market power, storage operators face strong incentives to restrain quantities ...
Sergei Balakin, Guillaume Roger
wiley +1 more source
Stationary Markov Equilibrium Strategies in Asynchronous Stochastic Games: Existence and Computation
AlgorithmsWe study Asynchronous Dynamic games and show that in games with a finite state space and finite action sets, one can obtain the pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium by using a simple backward induction method when the time period for the game is ...
Subir. K. Chakrabarti +2 more
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The RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Biased recommendations arise naturally in markets with heterogeneous consumers. We study a model in which a monopolist offers an experience good to a population of consumers with heterogeneous tastes and makes personalized purchase recommendations.
Martin Peitz, Anton Sobolev
wiley +1 more source
A Multiperiod Equilibrium Pricing Model
Journal of Applied Mathematics, 2014 We propose an equilibrium pricing model in a dynamic multiperiod stochastic framework with uncertain income. There are one tradable risky asset (stock/commodity), one nontradable underlying (temperature), and also a contingent claim (weather derivative ...
Minsuk Kwak +2 more
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