A symbolic shortest path algorithm for computing subgame-perfect Nash equilibria
Consider games where players wish to minimize the cost to reach some state. A subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium can be regarded as a collection of optimal paths on such games.
Góngora Pedro A., Rosenblueth David A.
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Efficient multi-period distribution mechanism for the innovation investment system under uncertainty [PDF]
In this paper, we study the problem of a venture investor who distributes the budget between several innovation projects under conditions of uncertainty.
Gurtuev Alim +2 more
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Construction of Subgame-Perfect Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in Repeated Games
This paper examines how to construct subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted repeated games with perfect monitoring. We introduce a relatively simple class of strategy profiles that are easy to compute and may give rise to a large set of ...
Kimmo Berg, Gijs Schoenmakers
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Perfect Equilibria in Replies in Multiplayer Bargaining
Multiplayer bargaining is a game in which all possible divisions are equilibrium outcomes. This paper presents the classical subgame perfect equilibria strategies and analyses their weak robustness, namely, the use of weakly dominated strategies.
Luís Carvalho
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Endogenous timing in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly with Cournot competition
This paper compares the equilibrium outcomes under simultaneous and sequential output setting in a mixed duopoly in a vertically differentiated market. When the timing of the output game is determined endogenously, it is shown that simultaneous play in ...
Feng Leidong, Gu Mengdi
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5G Price Competition with Social Equilibrium Optimality for Social Networks
Due to the leaps of progress in the 5G telecommunication industry, commodity pricing and consumer choice are frequently subject to change and competition in the search for optimal supply and demand.
Yuhao Feng +3 more
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Auctioning the Right to Play Ultimatum Games and the Impact on Equilibrium Selection
We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and charge exogenous participation fees.
Jason Shachat, J. Todd Swarthout
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The Decision Whether to Hire Managers in a Mixed Duopoly with State-Owned and Labor-Managed Firms [PDF]
This paper considers a mixed duopoly model in which a state-owned firm competes with a labor-managed firm. The timing of this game is as follows. In the first stage, each firm decides whether or not to hire a manager.
Kazuhiro Ohnishi
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On gamesmen and fair men: explaining fairness in non-cooperative bargaining games [PDF]
Experiments on bargaining games have repeatedly shown that subjects fail to use backward induction, and that they only rarely make demands in accordance with the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Ramzi Suleiman
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Exploring the Gap between Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium
In (Bonanno, 2013), a solution concept for extensive-form games, called perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), was introduced and shown to be a strict refinement of subgame-perfect equilibrium; it was also shown that, in turn, sequential equilibrium (SE) is
Giacomo Bonanno
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