Results 61 to 70 of about 18,680 (218)
An Approximate Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium Computation Technique for Repeated Games
This paper presents a technique for approximating, up to any precision, the set of subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) in repeated games with discounting. The process starts with a single hypercube approximation of the set of SPE payoff profiles. Then the initial hypercube is gradually partitioned on to a set of smaller adjacent hypercubes,
Burkov, Andriy, Chaib-draa, Brahim
openaire +2 more sources
ABSTRACT This study considers consumers' environmental awareness of polluting firms' managerial delegation contracts and compares the effects of committed and time‐consistent emission tax policies. It reveals that when environmental performance (EP) incentives prevail, sales performance (SP) incentives depend on the emission tax type and competition ...
Lili Xu, Yuntong Yin, Sang‐Ho Lee
wiley +1 more source
Two-Player Location Game in a Closed-Loop Market with Quantity Competition
This paper considers the two-player location game in a closed-loop market with quantity competition. Based on the Cournot and Hotelling models, a circle model is established for a closed-loop market in which two players (firms) play a location game under
Xiaofeng Chen +2 more
doaj +1 more source
Solution of mathematical programming formulations of subgame perfect equilibrium problems [PDF]
Mathematical programming models have been developed to represent imperfectly competitive (oligopolistic) market structures and the interdependencies of decision-making units in establishing prices and production levels. The solution of these models represents an economic equilibrium.
Macal, C. M., Hurter, A. P.
openaire +2 more sources
Cooperation and Managerial Delegation in Duopoly Revisited
ABSTRACT This paper shows that the cooperative game with managerial delegation (in both the Cournot and Bertrand settings) and the Bertrand benchmark game (without delegation or cooperation) are equivalent in duopoly. The cooperative solution may be the equilibrium of the game, and this outcome can be beneficial for consumer surplus and welfare when ...
José A. Novo‐Peteiro
wiley +1 more source
On the Rationality of Escalation [PDF]
Escalation is a typical feature of infinite games. Therefore tools conceived for studying infinite mathematical structures, namely those deriving from coinduction are essential.
Lescanne, Pierre, Matthieu, Perrinel
core +1 more source
Subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with deterministic procedures [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire +1 more source
Climate shocks, democratization and (a culture of) cooperation
Abstract While the direct economic effects of adverse climate shocks are well known, their indirect institutional impact is still poorly understood. To clarify this, we test the idea that adverse climate shocks push time‐inconsistent elites to enact inclusive political institutions, and non‐elites to embrace strong norms of cooperation.
Giacomo Benati, Carmine Guerriero
wiley +1 more source
To deal with resource allocation in heterogeneous wireless networks,an algorithm based on multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg games model was proposed to satisfy optimal utility of both operators and mobile users.The mobile user’s utility function ...
Yong JIANG, Shan-zhi CHEN, Bo HU
doaj +2 more sources
Comparison Between Seller and Buyer Pricing Systems for Energy Trading in Microgrids
In this paper, two systems for energy trading among energy prosumers are proposed: a buyer-pricing-system (BPS), in which buyers determine the price of energy and a seller-pricing-system (SPS) in which sellers determine the price of energy.
Sohee Bae, Sangdon Park
doaj +1 more source

