Results 71 to 80 of about 464 (200)

Organizational Design With Portable Skills

open access: yesJournal of Economics &Management Strategy, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 196-216, Spring 2026.
ABSTRACT Workers learn from the tasks they perform, and in the process, they accumulate human capital that is potentially portable. Companies that cannot commit to specific task allocations may assign employees to tasks that reduce retention costs and do not maximize productivity.
Luca Picariello
wiley   +1 more source

Critical Discount Factor Values in Discounted Supergames

open access: yesGames, 2018
This paper examines the subgame-perfect equilibria in symmetric 2×2 supergames. We solve the smallest discount factor value for which the players obtain all the feasible and individually rational payoffs as equilibrium payoffs.
Kimmo Berg, Markus Kärki
doaj   +1 more source

On refinements of subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium

open access: yesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 2016
The concept of subgame perfect -equilibrium (-SPE), where is an error-term, has in recent years emerged as a prominent solution concept for perfect information games of infinite duration. We propose two refinements of this concept: continuity -SPE and -tolerance equilibrium.
Flesch, Janos, Predtetchinski, Arkadi
openaire   +1 more source

On the Provision of International Public Goods in Dynamic Open Economies

open access: yesReview of International Economics, Volume 34, Issue 1, Page 198-218, February 2026.
ABSTRACT This study develops a dynamic two‐country model with an international public good, the stock of which positively affects the productivity of the private‐goods sectors in each country, and the evolution of the stock is determined by each country's voluntary contribution in the form of public investment. Two scenarios are examined: A cooperative
Akihiko Yanase
wiley   +1 more source

Analytical Examination of Strategic and Purposeful Behaviours in Peer‐to‐Peer Energy Trading

open access: yesIET Generation, Transmission &Distribution, Volume 20, Issue 1, January/December 2026.
This paper examines the strategic behaviour of prosumers in the P2P energy trading market. Prosumers may reduce the amount of energy they supply with the aim of increasing the clearing price. On the other hand, the market‐clearing mechanism is designed to mitigate such behaviours.
Ali Izanlo   +5 more
wiley   +1 more source

Adaptive Quantization for Distributed Estimation in Energy-Harvesting Wireless Sensor Networks: A Game-Theoretic Approach

open access: yesInternational Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks, 2014
The problem of distributed estimation in energy-harvesting wireless sensor networks (EH-WSNs) is studied. In general, the energy state of an energy-harvesting sensor varies dramatically.
Hua Liu   +4 more
doaj   +1 more source

Bargaining over Strategies of Non-Cooperative Games

open access: yesGames, 2015
We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game.
Giuseppe Attanasi   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

Adjustment costs and fluctuations in competitions

open access: yesEconomica, Volume 93, Issue 369, Page 260-297, January 2026.
Abstract History has repeatedly shown that periods of military disarmament are often followed by periods of rearmament when new geopolitical tensions arise. This paper analyses the causes of these cycles in a theoretical model. Two competitors compete in a repeated contest.
Martin Grossmann
wiley   +1 more source

Resource Management Framework Based on the Stackelberg Game in Vehicular Edge Computing

open access: yesComplexity, 2020
With the emergence and development of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), quick response time and ultralow delay are required. Cloud computing services are unfavorable for reducing delay and response time.
Guang-Shun Li   +5 more
doaj   +1 more source

Maximal Differentiation or Minimal Differentiation? Signal Jamming in Location Competition in Duopoly

open access: yesThe Manchester School, Volume 94, Issue 1, Page 24-38, January 2026.
ABSTRACT In this study, we argue that the result of maximal differentiation by d’Aspremont et al. (1979) is not robust against all variations in qualities. The result that two firms are located at opposite ends of a linear city holds only when the product qualities are identical or similar.
Sawoong Kang, Jeong‐Yoo Kim
wiley   +1 more source

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy