Results 41 to 50 of about 13,525 (178)

Cross‐border reciprocal bartering in public–private tetradic networks

Decision Sciences, EarlyView.
Abstract Under the background of semiconductor and vaccine shortages during COVID‐19‐driven supply chain disruptions, this article adopts a multimethodological approach to investigate strategic solutions for cross‐border scarce goods bartering in a public–private (P–P) tetradic reciprocal network, which involves two pairs of P–P collaborative dyads ...
Jiuh‐Biing Sheu, Tsan‐Ming Choi, Thomas Y. Choi   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Bank Capital and Misconduct Incentives

Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper studies large banks' incentives to engage in misconduct by abusing their dominant position in the market for loans and by mis‐selling an add‐on financial product to depositors. We draw new connections between stability‐focused prudential regulation and misconduct by studying the impact of higher capital requirements on misconduct ...
Jacob Seifert
wiley   +1 more source

Buyer Power and the Effect of Vertical Integration on Innovation

Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Our article investigates the impact of vertical integration (without foreclosure) on innovation. We compare cases where either (i) two manufacturers or (ii) a manufacturer and a vertically integrated retailer invest. Then, the independent manufacturer(s) and the retailer bargain over nonlinear contracts before selling to consumers.
Claire Chambolle, Morgane Guignard
wiley   +1 more source

Serial Investing and Strategic Commitment in Markets With Unknown Competitors

Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We study how serial investors who regularly face unknown competitors attempt to make their projects dominant. Innovating in new markets often involves uncertainty over the nature of the final product and who the key competitors will be. Such projects also have long‐term funding needs, so a commitment to provide the necessary funds imparts a ...
Naveen Khanna, Richmond Mathews
wiley   +1 more source

The Voting Premium

The Journal of Finance, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We develop a unified theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium in a setting without takeovers or controlling shareholders. A voting premium emerges when a minority blockholder can influence shareholder composition by accumulating votes and buying shares from dissenting shareholders.
DORON LEVIT, NADYA MALENKO, ERNST MAUG
wiley   +1 more source

Consumers' Environmental Awareness and Firms' Managerial Delegation Contracts Under Emission Tax Policies

Scottish Journal of Political Economy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This study considers consumers' environmental awareness of polluting firms' managerial delegation contracts and compares the effects of committed and time‐consistent emission tax policies. It reveals that when environmental performance (EP) incentives prevail, sales performance (SP) incentives depend on the emission tax type and competition ...
Lili Xu, Yuntong Yin, Sang‐Ho Lee
wiley   +1 more source

Cooperation and Managerial Delegation in Duopoly Revisited

Bulletin of Economic Research, Volume 78, Issue 2, Page 368-384, April 2026.
ABSTRACT This paper shows that the cooperative game with managerial delegation (in both the Cournot and Bertrand settings) and the Bertrand benchmark game (without delegation or cooperation) are equivalent in duopoly. The cooperative solution may be the equilibrium of the game, and this outcome can be beneficial for consumer surplus and welfare when ...
José A. Novo‐Peteiro
wiley   +1 more source

Asymmetric Platform Oligopoly

The RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 57, Issue 1, Page 60-77, Spring 2026.
ABSTRACT We propose a tractable model of asymmetric platform oligopoly with logit demand in which users from two distinct groups are subject to within‐group and cross‐group network effects and decide which platform to join. We characterize the equilibrium when platforms manage user access by setting participation fees for each user group.
Martin Peitz, Susumu Sato
wiley   +1 more source

Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium analysis in a two-population strategic matching queue with nonzero matching times

Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium analysis in a two-population strategic matching queue with nonzero matching times
We study a two-population strategic queueing game in a double-ended system with nonzero matching times, where agents choose to join or balk. The resulting multi-dimensional state complicates analysis, but it can be shown that one dimension can be omitted in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium strategies are threshold-based.
Hung Q. Nguyen, Tuan Phung-Duc
openaire   +2 more sources

Addressing Daigou from the Perspective of Channel Competition: Strategy for Retail Management

Mathematics
In China’s on-demand service platforms, daigou agents utilize locational differences through proxy purchasing. Daigou creates an informal supply chain that directly competes with official channels.
Keqin Chang, Rachael Kwai Fun Ip, Pak Hou Che   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source