Results 101 to 110 of about 565,621 (224)
On the computation of stable sets for bimatrix games [PDF]
In this paper it is shown how to compute stable sets, defined by Mertens (1989), inthe context of bimatrix games only using linear optimization techniques.combinatorics;
Vermeulen,Dries, Jansen,Mathijs
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Inferring Foresightedness in Dynamic Noncooperative Games
Dynamic game theory is an increasingly popular tool for modeling multi-agent, e.g. human-robot, interactions. Game-theoretic models presume that each agent wishes to minimize a private cost function that depends on others' actions. These games typically evolve over a fixed time horizon, specifying how far into the future each agent plans.
Cade Armstrong +4 more
openaire +3 more sources
Linear Quadratic Games: An Overview [PDF]
In this paper we review some basic results on linear quadratic differential games.We consider both the cooperative and non-cooperative case.For the non-cooperative game we consider the open-loop and (linear) feedback information structure.Furthermore the
Engwerda, J.C.
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On the optimal management of environmental stock externalities. [PDF]
Xepapadeas A.
europepmc +1 more source
A simplicial algorithm approach to Nash equilibria in concave games [PDF]
In this paper we demonstrate a new method for computing approximate Nash equilibria in n-person games. Strategy spaces are assumed to be represented by simplices, while payoff functions are assumed to be concave.
Claus-Jochen Haake, Francis Edward Su
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Stochastic dominance equilibria in two-person noncooperative games [PDF]
Two-person noncooperative games with finitely many pure strategies and ordinal preferences over pure outcomes are considered, in which probability distributions resulting from mixed strategies are evaluated according to t-degree stochastic dominance. A t-
Vermeulen,Dries +3 more
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A theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games: genericity, stability, and purification [PDF]
This paper studies generic properties of Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games. We show that almost all dynamic stochastic games have a finite number of locally isolated Markov perfect equilibria.
Doraszelski, Ulrich, Escobar, Juan
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Social Networks: Equilibrium Selection and Friendliness [PDF]
Given their importance in determining the outcome of many economic interactions, different models have been proposed to determine how social networks form and which structures are stable.
Jacqueline Morgan, Giuseppe De Marco
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"Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players" [PDF]
We investigate two-player infinitely repeated games where the discount factor is less than but close to unity. Monitoring is private and players cannot communicate. We require no condition concerning the accuracy of players' monitoring technology.
Hitoshi Matsushima
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Games aimed at those with learning difficulties or disabilities - Pre-entry games - Games machine - variety of games on many subjects including science, maths, history, music, arts etc and categorised by learners age.
Highbury College, LSN, Q Projects
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