Results 51 to 60 of about 464 (200)
Competitive diplomacy in bargaining and war
American Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.Abstract War is often viewed as a bargaining problem. However, prior to bargaining, countries can vie for leverage by expending effort on diplomacy. This article presents a dynamic model of conflict where agenda‐setting power is endogenous to pre‐bargaining diplomatic competition.
Joseph J. Ruggiero
wiley +1 more source
Resource Competition in Blockchain Networks Under Cloud and Device Enabled Participation
IEEE Access, 2022 Blockchain technology is a promising resource management architecture due to its ability of building trust in a decentralized transaction. Block mining participants, i.e. miners, are incentivized with reward for successfully mining blocks. Unfortunately,
Yuxiang Liang +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Cooperation and Managerial Delegation in Duopoly Revisited
Bulletin of Economic Research, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This paper shows that the cooperative game with managerial delegation (in both the Cournot and Bertrand settings) and the Bertrand benchmark game (without delegation or cooperation) are equivalent in duopoly. The cooperative solution may be the equilibrium of the game, and this outcome can be beneficial for consumer surplus and welfare when ...
José A. Novo‐Peteiro
wiley +1 more source
FogCom:SDN-enabled fog node selection for early detection of communicable diseases
Journal of King Saud University: Computer and Information Sciences, 2023 A communicable illness is one that spreads from person to person by a number of means, including contact with blood and body fluids, inhaling an airborne virus, or being bitten by an insect.
Joy Lal Sarkar +8 more
doaj +1 more source
Cross‐border reciprocal bartering in public–private tetradic networks
Decision Sciences, EarlyView.Abstract Under the background of semiconductor and vaccine shortages during COVID‐19‐driven supply chain disruptions, this article adopts a multimethodological approach to investigate strategic solutions for cross‐border scarce goods bartering in a public–private (P–P) tetradic reciprocal network, which involves two pairs of P–P collaborative dyads ...
Jiuh‐Biing Sheu +2 more
wiley +1 more source
BACKWARD INDUCTION: MERITS AND FLAWS
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 2017 Backward induction (BI) was one of the earliest methods developed for solving finite sequential games with perfect information. It proved to be especially useful in the context of Tom Schelling’s ideas of credible versus incredible threats.
Kamiński Marek M.
doaj +1 more source
Climate shocks, democratization and (a culture of) cooperation
Economica, EarlyView.Abstract While the direct economic effects of adverse climate shocks are well known, their indirect institutional impact is still poorly understood. To clarify this, we test the idea that adverse climate shocks push time‐inconsistent elites to enact inclusive political institutions, and non‐elites to embrace strong norms of cooperation.
Giacomo Benati, Carmine Guerriero
wiley +1 more source
Strategic Flip‐Flopping in Political Competition
International Economic Review, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We study candidates' position adjustments in response to information about voters' preferences. Repositioning allows candidates to move closer to the median voter, but it incurs financial and electoral costs. In a subgame‐perfect equilibrium, candidates diverge from the center ex ante if the costs of adjustment are sufficiently large.
Gaëtan Fournier +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Debt Ceilings With Fiscal Intransparency and Imperfect Electoral Accountability
International Economic Review, EarlyView.ABSTRACT We study optimal debt ceilings in a political‐agency model with uncertainty about both policymaker type (benevolent or selfish) and economic state (good or bad). Elections generate disciplining and selection effects that differ across pooling, hybrid, and separating equilibria induced by different ceilings.
Randolph Sloof +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Stochastic Differential Games for Which the Open-Loop Equilibrium is Subgame Perfect
Dynamic Games and Applications, 2017 It is generally admitted that a correct forecasting of uncertain variables needs Markov decision rules. In a dynamic game environment, this belief is reinforced if one focuses on credible actions of the players. Usually, subgame perfectness requires equilibrium strategies to be constructed on Markov rules.
Ricardo Josa-Fombellida +1 more
openaire +2 more sources