Results 51 to 60 of about 18,680 (218)

Subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies for time-inconsistent recursive stochastic control problems

open access: yesJournal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 2023
arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:2105 ...
Mastrogiacomo, E, Tarsia, M
openaire   +3 more sources

Bank Capital and Misconduct Incentives

open access: yesJournal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper studies large banks' incentives to engage in misconduct by abusing their dominant position in the market for loans and by mis‐selling an add‐on financial product to depositors. We draw new connections between stability‐focused prudential regulation and misconduct by studying the impact of higher capital requirements on misconduct ...
Jacob Seifert
wiley   +1 more source

Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games [PDF]

open access: yes, 2014
We introduce a notion of subgames for stochastic timing games and the related notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium in possibly mixed strategies. While a good notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium for continuous-time games is not available in general, we
Riedel, Frank, Steg, Jan-Henrik
core   +1 more source

Buyer Power and the Effect of Vertical Integration on Innovation

open access: yesJournal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Our article investigates the impact of vertical integration (without foreclosure) on innovation. We compare cases where either (i) two manufacturers or (ii) a manufacturer and a vertically integrated retailer invest. Then, the independent manufacturer(s) and the retailer bargain over nonlinear contracts before selling to consumers.
Claire Chambolle, Morgane Guignard
wiley   +1 more source

Serial Investing and Strategic Commitment in Markets With Unknown Competitors

open access: yesJournal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We study how serial investors who regularly face unknown competitors attempt to make their projects dominant. Innovating in new markets often involves uncertainty over the nature of the final product and who the key competitors will be. Such projects also have long‐term funding needs, so a commitment to provide the necessary funds imparts a ...
Naveen Khanna, Richmond Mathews
wiley   +1 more source

Invitation Games: An Experimental Approach to Coalition Formation

open access: yesGames, 2021
This paper studies how to form an efficient coalition—a group of people. More specifically, we compare two mechanisms for forming a coalition by running a laboratory experiment and reveal which mechanism leads to higher social surplus. In one setting, we
Takaaki Abe   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

Stochastic Differential Games for Which the Open-Loop Equilibrium is Subgame Perfect

open access: yesDynamic Games and Applications, 2017
It is generally admitted that a correct forecasting of uncertain variables needs Markov decision rules. In a dynamic game environment, this belief is reinforced if one focuses on credible actions of the players. Usually, subgame perfectness requires equilibrium strategies to be constructed on Markov rules.
Ricardo Josa-Fombellida   +1 more
openaire   +2 more sources

Leader‐Follower Dynamics in Shareholder Activism

open access: yesThe Journal of Finance, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We propose a theory of coordination and influence among blockholders. Privately informed activists time their trades in sequence to lower acquisition costs, prompting a strategic use of order flows: leader activists create trading gains for their followers, ultimately influencing their willingness to bear greater value‐enhancing intervention ...
DORUK CETEMEN   +3 more
wiley   +1 more source

The Voting Premium

open access: yesThe Journal of Finance, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We develop a unified theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium in a setting without takeovers or controlling shareholders. A voting premium emerges when a minority blockholder can influence shareholder composition by accumulating votes and buying shares from dissenting shareholders.
DORON LEVIT, NADYA MALENKO, ERNST MAUG
wiley   +1 more source

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