Results 81 to 90 of about 18,680 (218)

Dynamic Incentives in Incompletely Specified Environments

Econometrica, Volume 94, Issue 2, Page 375-406, March 2026.
Consider a repeated interaction where it is unknown which of various stage games will be played each period. This framework separates the basic logic of intertemporal incentives from the requirement that any given strategy profile yields a well‐defined payoff vector.
Gabriel Carroll
wiley   +1 more source

Bargaining over Strategies of Non-Cooperative Games

Games, 2015
We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game.
Giuseppe Attanasi, Aurora García-Gallego, Nikolaos Georgantzís, Aldo Montesano   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

Resource Management Framework Based on the Stackelberg Game in Vehicular Edge Computing

Complexity, 2020
With the emergence and development of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), quick response time and ultralow delay are required. Cloud computing services are unfavorable for reducing delay and response time.
Guang-Shun Li, Ying Zhang, Mao-Li Wang, Jun-Hua Wu, Qing-Yan Lin, Xiao-Fei Sheng   +5 more
doaj   +1 more source

Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods Monopolist: Corrigendum [PDF]

In this paper we make a new analysis of the model presented in Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel (1984). They propose a model in discrete time, such that at each period a new cohort of agents enters the market –each cohort is composed by two types of agents ...
César L. Guerrero Luchtenberg
core  

Monotonicity and Robust Implementation Under Forward‐Induction Reasoning

Econometrica, Volume 94, Issue 2, Page 505-536, March 2026.
In sequential games, the set of paths consistent with rationality and forward‐induction reasoning may change nonmonotonically when adding transparent restrictions on players' beliefs. Yet, we prove that—in an incomplete‐information environment—predictions become sharper when the restrictions only concern initial beliefs about types.
Pierpaolo Battigalli, Emiliano Catonini
wiley   +1 more source

AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part I: definition and properties. [PDF]

We provide a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium which can be applied to arbitrary extensive-form games and is intermediate between subgame-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium.
Giacomo Bonanno
core  

A Multi-Step Model for Pie Cutting with Random Offers

Mathematics
The problem of dividing a pie between two persons is considered. An arbitration procedure for dividing the pie is proposed, in which the arbitrator is a random number generator. In this procedure, the arbitrator makes an offer to the players at each step,
Vladimir Mazalov, Vladimir Yashin
doaj   +1 more source

The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games [PDF]

Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there
Demichelis, Stefano, Ritzberger, Klaus, Swinkels, Jeroen M.   +2 more
core  

Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games

Games, 2010
We introduce consistency of beliefs in the space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi) and use it to provide epistemic conditions for equilibria in finite multi-stage games with observed actions.
Paulo Barelli
doaj   +1 more source

NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A MODEL OF MULTIPRODUCT PRICE COMPETITION: AN ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM [PDF]

We study the market interaction of a finite number of single-product firms and a representative buyer, where the buyer consumes bundles of these goods. The buyers' value function determines their willingness to pay for subsets of goods.
Amparo Urbano, Ivan Arribas
core